The Ottawa Police Service: My Greatest Hits
A civilian Police Services Board exists because Ontario law requires it. Every municipality with its own police force must have an independent civilian board that sets objectives and priorities after consulting the chief, hires and evaluates the chief, approves the budget, and establishes policies. It does not run day-to-day operations. The Ottawa board has seven members: three councillors, three provincial citizen appointees, and one council-appointed citizen. That structure is meant to keep politics at arm’s length while still representing the public.
In practice the arrangement has been tested and found wanting.
The convoy and the resignations
During the 2022 Freedom Convoy occupation, Chief Peter Sloly publicly expected the protest to clear after the first weekend, then requested roughly 1,800 extra officers. He resigned on day 19. Board chair Diane Deans declared the city “under siege,” pressed for an end plan, and moved to hire a replacement chief with limited transparency. Council voted 15-9 to remove her the next night. The two other councillors on the board, including Rawlson King, resigned in protest. King later described the removal of Deans as political interference and defended the board’s record on his way out.
The city’s own auditor later found the board did not receive timely operational information it needed to exercise oversight and that it violated its own procedural rules during emergency meetings. The pattern was reactive: institutions reorganized after the crisis peaked, not while it was unfolding. King has not returned to the board. The unglamorous work of oversight continued without him.
Workplace culture and the office that vanished
A 2021 review of workplace violence and harassment produced a cornerstone recommendation: an independent investigations office outside the chain of command. It was created in 2022. In October 2023 the service shut it down. Board members learned about the closure the day of their meeting. Public reports that month still described the office as operational and improving. The safe-workplace budget later dropped from $8.2 million to $5.4 million. Current and former members have said they do not believe meaningful change has occurred after a decade of reviews and millions spent.
The chief has authority over internal structure. The board has authority over policy and oversight. When the two do not talk before a major cultural-reform office disappears, the public is left with the same problem the office was created to fix.
Databases as dating apps
Multiple officers have been disciplined for unauthorized searches of restricted systems (MTO driver records and CPIC). One constable faced charges after 77 queries, including women he admitted he found attractive and colleagues. Another was demoted after 69 unauthorized searches of ex-partners, people he met at the gym, and members of the public. Chief Eric Stubbs later told members internally that officers were using databases “as their own way to meet women”—seeing someone at a coffee shop or gym, running the plate, and following up. The Auditor General found the service’s own auditing of database access “not robust.” Anomaly detection on access logs is standard technology. It is not being applied here as a first-line control.
Trust but verify: the Auditor General’s files
In May 2026 the Auditor General reported that project-management reporting to the board contained inaccuracies and outdated budgets (body-worn cameras were one example). Projects sometimes launched without formal approved budgets. Oversight information was “vague.” Separate audits found outdated staffing targets, incomplete training records, and heavy reliance on overtime. Body-camera reporting to the board has historically omitted key metrics. The board is supposed to receive reliable information so it can do its job. It has not always received it.
The 1:130 split
The 2026 OPS net operating budget sits at $414.9 million. ANCHOR, the civilian mental-health and substance-use crisis response that resolved 92 percent of its calls without police in its first year, is funded at roughly $3.2 million. That is a 1:130 ratio. OPS receives 99.2 percent of the combined safety dollars; the alternative that demonstrably diverts non-violent calls receives 0.8 percent. Expanding ANCHOR to a city-wide 24/7 service on the scale of Toronto’s equivalent would still be a few percent of the police budget. The current allocation treats armed officers as the default response to social distress. Police themselves say that is not their core mandate.
Ward 13 numbers
In Rideau-Rockcliffe, overall crime rose 9 percent in 2025, driven by theft under $5,000 and fraud. The Crime Severity Index jumped 11 percent to 82.68. Robbery clearance fell from 42.4 percent to 20 percent even as volume dropped. Assault clearance also declined. Property-crime clearance remains in the single digits. Volume and seriousness are moving in the wrong direction while clearance on several categories is weakening. Those are the numbers residents live with.
What the record actually shows
The recurring themes are not isolated incidents. They are a pattern: recommendations without binding timelines or consequences, internal investigations that stay internal, reporting to the civilian board that is incomplete or inaccurate, a cultural-reform office closed without prior consultation, database controls that fail to stop obvious abuse, and a budget that pours almost everything into the most expensive response while starving the cheaper one that works for the majority of mental-health calls.
The board exists to prevent exactly this. Councillors who sit on it are there to stay through the unglamorous parts—the audits, the budget fights, the workplace-culture files—not to resign when the politics get hard. Oversight that only operates when the cameras are rolling is not oversight.
The public pays for the guns, the databases, the overtime, and the $414.9 million. It is entitled to verified results, not self-reported competence. Trust, but verify. The verification tools already exist: independent investigations reporting to the board, real-time audit logs with alerts, monthly public metrics on complaints and discipline, and a budget that matches the actual mix of problems the city faces. Using them is a choice.
Source Posts
| # | Title | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | Police Services Board – Why does it exist? Why would a Councillor resign from the OPS? | 15 Sep 2023 | unpublished.ca |
| — | Issues and Stances (2022 OPS Board / Sloly section) | May 2022 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #229 | OPS – What can be done? | 23 Jun 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| — | Rideau-Rockcliffe Clearance is not tight and severity is up | 26 Jul 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #408 | Pattern Recognition / Twenty days in winter | Aug 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #412 | ANCHOR vrs. Ottawa Police Service : we are not in balance | 12 Aug 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #416 | Whistle blowers – do we support them enough? | Aug 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #418 | OPS – Trust but verify! | 13 Aug 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #427 | For the “How” – I’m your man | 16 Aug 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #435 | Recommendations to The OPS Board | 18 Aug 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
| #480 | After seven years (Police Services Board section) | 2 Sep 2026 | peterkarwacki.blogspot.com |
Compiled from the posts above. For the latest entries see peterkarwacki.blogspot.com.
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