Campaign Video

Https://youtu.be/zBxbnuPAazE

Monday, 2 November 2026

#596 The Alstom tail risk to Ottawa's LRT

Alstom Is a Tail Risk for Ottawa’s LRT. Who Is Watching It?

Alstom Is a Tail Risk for Ottawa’s LRT. Who Is Watching It?

A second profit warning in seven months from the company that built and maintains our trains. Probably not a crisis, but nobody has told us whether the City is looking.

On Monday, Alstom’s shares fell about 25% after the French trainmaker cut its outlook for the second time this year. It now expects an adjusted operating margin of around 1%, down from 6.5%, and negative free cash flow of about €1.5 billion. It is also signalling asset sales to shore up its balance sheet. The trouble is Coradia Max regional trains in Germany, not anything in Ottawa.

So why should Ottawa care? Because Alstom is woven into our LRT.

A tail risk is a low-probability, high-consequence event. This is not a forecast that the Confederation Line is about to stop. It is a question about whether anyone is managing a risk that would be very expensive if it did arrive.

Where Alstom sits in the system

RoleWhat we know
Stage 1 vehicles34 Citadis Spirit LRVs supplied under a 2013 subcontract with Rideau Transit Group (RTG).
Stage 2 vehicles38 more Citadis Spirit LRVs. As of the March 2026 Transit Committee update, 30 were accepted, 7 were in production and 1 was in dynamic testing.
MaintenanceA trade report says Alstom maintains the vehicles, and the light rail system, for 30 years.
Parent guarantee, bond or escrowed documentationNot public.

Delivery risk on the fleet is mostly behind us. The long-term risk is the 30 years of maintenance and support. A bespoke fleet needs parts, engineering help and trained people for decades, and that obligation is only as strong as whoever stands behind it.

Alstom’s guidance, before and after

  • October 2023: first warningProblems after the Bombardier acquisition. Alstom later raised €1 billion in new equity, issued a €750 million hybrid bond and sold assets.
  • April 2026: targets withdrawnThe three-year €1.5 billion free cash flow goal was dropped and the 8–10% margin ambition abandoned. Net debt was about €400 million at March 31, with a backlog near €100 billion.
  • November 2, 2026: second warningNegative free cash flow of about €1.5 billion, a lower production target, and talk of a new €2 billion deleveraging plan.

Why this probably isn’t a crisis

Alstom’s debt was modest as of March, its credit lines were undrawn, and demand is strong. It has recapitalized before. The City’s contract is with RTG, not Alstom, so a subcontractor stumbling is first RTG’s problem, and RTG’s parents and lenders have every reason to keep a P3 asset running. Rail is also strategically important in Europe, which makes a disorderly collapse unlikely.

Why it still matters

Distress rarely arrives as a bankruptcy. It arrives as a company protecting cash: parts orders slow, experienced engineers leave and support teams get thinner. For a rail system with Ottawa’s reliability record, that slow erosion is the realistic version of this risk. It would show up as fewer trains in service long before it showed up in a court filing.

This is the outputs-versus-outcomes problem again. A signed contract is an output. A train that runs on time in February is an outcome. Council can point to the first while having no visibility into the second.

Five questions the City should answer

  1. Does Alstom’s maintenance obligation carry a parent-company guarantee, a performance bond or other security, and who holds it?
  2. What step-in rights do the City or RTG’s lenders have if Alstom cannot perform?
  3. Is the technical documentation and parts-supply information for the Citadis Spirit fleet in escrow, or otherwise available to a replacement maintainer?
  4. Have staff been briefed on Alstom’s financial position, and will Transit Committee get a public update?
  5. What would a transition to another maintainer cost, and who pays?

What I don’t know

I haven’t seen the Stage 1 or Stage 2 contract terms. Much of the P3 documentation is redacted or confidential, which is the point. If the protections exist, the City should say so and put residents’ minds at ease. If they don’t, we should find out before the problem arrives rather than after.

Asking now costs nothing. Finding out later could cost a lot.

Sources

#595 Gambling

Don’t Gamble. Not Even a Lottery Ticket.

We’re told that luck is something you buy. A scratch card at the corner store, a few dollars on the game, a small bet on a hot stock tip or the coin everyone is talking about. It all looks harmless, and it’s sold to us as fun.

The house isn’t in the business of fun. It’s in the business of math, and the math is built to work against you every time.

The odds are the product. Lotteries pay out only a portion of what they take in. A casino game, a betting app, a scratch ticket: each is designed so that, over time, the player loses and the operator wins. A ticket is not a small investment in a big dream. It’s a small, guaranteed loss with a tiny chance of a windfall.

Speculation wears the same costume. Day trading, options, and leveraged crypto aren’t legally “gambling,” but the pattern can look the same: chasing losses, checking constantly, risking money you can’t afford to lose. Most retail day traders lose money. The apps are designed with notifications and bright interfaces to keep you coming back.

The real damage isn’t the money lost on a Friday night. Research in several countries links serious gambling problems to much higher rates of depression, debt, broken relationships, and suicidal thoughts and attempts. We don’t have precise numbers for every kind of betting, and some of that risk is tangled up with other struggles. But the direction of the evidence is clear enough.

Gambling harm also hides well. Nobody smells it on your breath. People carry the debt and the shame in silence, sometimes for years. In the illegal market, owing money to the wrong people can add threats and fear on top of everything else. That’s no way to live.

So here’s my message: make your own luck.

Luck you make doesn’t come in a ticket. It comes from:

  • the skill you learn that makes you hireable
  • the small business you start, even part-time
  • the money you set aside every month, boring as that sounds
  • the relationships and reputation you build over years
  • the work you show up for when nobody’s watching

None of it is glamorous, and none of it pays out overnight. But the odds are in your favour, and every year it compounds in your direction instead of the house’s.

If you’re already in a hole, there’s no shame in asking for help, and the sooner the better. In Ontario, ConnexOntario offers free, confidential support for gambling problems at 1-866-531-2600. If you’re in crisis or thinking about suicide, you can call or text 9-8-8 anywhere in Canada, any time.

Skip the ticket. Bet on yourself instead.

Sunday, 1 November 2026

#594 Waiting' on the Robots

 


A new song...my lyrics, AI music and vocals


https://suno.com/song/6eba83d2-c86e-4405-9bfa-f9503b1c020e

Waiting on the Robots


I know they're coming

I heard it on the news

They told me it was useless

And just get over my robot blues


Its not that complicated,

They're just smarter, faster, better

Than me in every way cause

I'm just a human being

And High maintenance too


So I'm just waiting on the robots

Yeah I'm just waiting for the robots

EH Aye, waiting for the robots

To take me away, away, away


I saw the writing on the wall

The wind was a blowing

now the robot's are a blowing too


So I'm just waiting on the robots

Yeah I'm just waiting for the robots

EH Aye, waiting for the robots

To take me away, away, away


I thought that robots were just machines

But my new EH AYE buddy

Treats me better than you do


So I'm just waiting on the robots

Yeah I'm just waiting for the robots

EH Aye, waiting for the robots

To take me away, away, away


So I'm just waiting on the robots

Yeah I'm just waiting for the robots

EH Aye, waiting for the robots

To take me away, away, away


Kayaky

Saturday, 31 October 2026

#593 Diefenbunker 2.0

Diefenbunker 2.0?

Diefenbunker 2.0?

What a Cold War shelter in Carp can tell us about spending we aren’t allowed to see.

In Carp, Ontario, there’s a four-storey bunker built in secret to shelter Canada’s government through a nuclear war. I’ve been inside. The CBC’s emergency broadcast studio, the room meant to speak to a whole country after the worst day in its history, was about 12 feet by 12 feet.

One small room, one tape of pre-recorded messages, and the job of reaching every Canadian with a radio.

The Diefenbunker was built under a veil of secrecy, and the public didn’t understand its purpose or cost until long after the money was spent. It’s a museum now.

None of that is speculation. The Diefenbunker is real, it’s a designated National Historic Site, and anyone can tour it. It shows that Canada has built secret, expensive underground facilities for its officials and kept quiet about them until the Cold War was over.

So I think we should ask whether it’s happening again.

The bunker boom

Lately we’ve been told that billionaires are building bunkers. It sounds crazy, and some of it is rumour. Tech figures including Mark Zuckerberg, Sam Altman and Reid Hoffman are reportedly building or buying bunkers, secret compounds and “apocalypse insurance” plans. Zuckerberg’s Hawaii compound is the best-known example. It reportedly includes a huge underground shelter, though he denies it is a “doomsday bunker.”

We laugh at that, or we’re unsettled by it. But we’ve been here before, and the government of Canada has done it too. It built one near Carp with public money and kept it secret for years. It’s reasonable to ask, and this is speculation, whether the same thinking continues today in places the public isn’t invited to see. I have no evidence that it does. The point is that the Diefenbunker shows it has happened before, and secrecy is what makes the question impossible to answer.

Ogilvie Road

On Ogilvie Road in Ottawa, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) occupies the Edward Drake Building. The official cost estimate was $880 million, which made it the most expensive government building in Canada. Sources close to the project told CBC the true figure would be nearer $1.2 billion once associated costs were tallied. Next door, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) headquarters cost about $153.5 million when it was completed in 1995.

What the public record says
FacilityFigureWhat it is
CSIS headquarters, Ogilvie Rd.$153.5 millionTotal project cost, completed 1995
CSE, Edward Drake Building$880 millionOfficial estimate
CSE, Edward Drake Buildingabout $1.2 billionReported by sources close to the project, with associated costs included
CSE, Edward Drake Building$4.1 billion CONFIRMListed on Defence Construction Canada’s project page for the public-private partnership (P3). CONFIRMATION Unlikely
NRC Montreal Road campus, two new science labs$1.5 billionCombined budget for two labs announced under the Laboratories Canada program
of which TerraCanada National Capital Areaabout $1.05 billionPublic Services and Procurement Canada’s stated project value; construction began summer 2026

Sources: CBC News; Office of the Auditor General (CSIS headquarters); Defence Construction Canada; Public Services and Procurement Canada (TerraCanada).

I can’t prove this, and it is speculation on my part, but the pattern looks familiar. The Edward Drake Building is a very large, very expensive, very secure facility, and the public can’t see inside it.

I’m not saying it’s a bunker. The Diefenbunker was built to shelter officials from nuclear war. CSE’s job is signals intelligence and cyber defence. My point is narrower: the Diefenbunker’s secrecy meant the public couldn’t ask whether it was worth the cost until it no longer mattered.

Next door

CSE’s site was carved out of land that belonged to the National Research Council, and the NRC’s Montreal Road campus is now getting its own major construction. The federal government has announced two new science laboratories there with a combined budget of $1.5 billion, funded under the $3.7-billion Laboratories Canada program. The larger of the two, the TerraCanada National Capital Area facility, is valued at about $1.05 billion. Its stated components include a Class II nuclear facility, and construction began in summer 2026. The other, the Transportation Safety and Technology Science hub, is budgeted at about $500 million.

Then there’s what’s underground. The National Capital Commission’s design submission for the TerraCanada building describes a three-storey structure with a 9,200 square metre footprint, plus a partial basement and sub-basement, and a two-storey penthouse. Labs routinely have below-grade levels, so that alone proves nothing. But the public summary doesn’t say what those levels are for, and I think that’s the right question to put to the people spending the money. CONFIRMATION? unlikely to be forthcoming

Here the contrast matters. Those labs were announced publicly, with budgets, contractors and timelines posted on government websites. CSE’s building was not. Add the two at their official figures and you get roughly $2.4 billion of federal construction in one east-end corner of Ottawa. We can read the details on one project, and on the other we’re left with a headline number and sources close to the project.

“Don’t worry, you don’t need to know”

The usual answer to questions like these is some version of “don’t worry, you don’t need to know.” The trouble with that line is that it can’t be checked from outside. Nobody can show it’s wrong, so it works as a complete answer to any question.

Some secrecy around an intelligence agency is legitimate, and a reasonable reader may accept that. What we shouldn’t have to accept is that nobody outside the agency verifies its cost, purpose and design. Canada has bodies that can see what the public can’t, including the Auditor General, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. The question to put to the government is a specific one: who has actually looked, and what did they report?

We were effectively told the same thing about the Diefenbunker, until it became a museum. The bunker was real, and the secrecy around it was real too.

Questions to ask now

  1. What does the full $4.1 billion cover, and who is accountable for it?
  2. What oversight exists over cost overruns on a project that can’t be fully examined in public?
  3. What will we learn about this building in thirty years that we’re not allowed to know today?
  4. Why can we read the full budget and schedule for the labs next door, but not for CSE’s own building?
  5. Which review body has examined this building’s cost and design, and what did it report?

Canadians shouldn’t have to wait for a museum tour to find out.

Friday, 30 October 2026

#592 The Proposed Ottawa Hospital - $10 Billion? Not in this lifetime!

At one time MontMartre was considered expensive.... We got'em beat with the hospitals. Total Cost of the project? "No man Knows!"

The Civic Campus Bill: From $2.8 Billion to “Nearly Five Times” That

The Civic Campus Bill: From $2.8 Billion to “Nearly Five Times” That

Ontario’s infrastructure minister says the province alone is now investing close to $10 billion in The Ottawa Hospital’s new Civic Campus. Nobody has yet said who covers the rest.

This week, Ontario Infrastructure Minister David Piccini told a legislative committee that the province’s investment in the new Civic Campus is approaching five times the original estimate, or nearly $10 billion. The original project cost was $2.8 billion, of which the province was to provide $2.1 billion.

When Blais, a questioner at the committee, asked him to account for “a five-X increase in costs,” the minister’s explanation was a brief reference to supply chains. The Ministry of Health later said only that the project is complex and that it is working with the hospital and Infrastructure Ontario to ensure it is “competitively priced.”
To be clear...No updated total project cost has been published.

Before and after

ItemOriginal projectionLatest public information
Total project cost$2.8 billionNo official updated total. Minister’s figure for the provincial share alone is nearly $10 billion.
Provincial share$2.1 billionNearly $10 billion (minister’s statement to committee)
Local (community) shareAbout $687–700 millionNot confirmed. Blais estimated at committee roughly $2.25–2.5 billion. That is his estimate, not an official figure.
Ask of City of Ottawa$150 million (2022 request)Undecided. Left to the council elected Oct. 26. The mayor says the city will not cover “billions and billions” in added cost.
Foundation fundraising$500 million goal$404 million raised so far
Construction start2024Site preparation under way. Main hospital building not yet built.
Opening2028Critics and a project consultant point to well into the 2030s. An updated timeline is expected in the coming months.

The “nearly $10 billion” figure applies to the provincial investment only. It should not be read as the total project cost, which has not been published. Percentages: $10B is about 4.7 times the province’s original $2.1B share and about 3.6 times the original $2.8B total.

Who will pay for it?

The original funding model was simple. Ontario would cover $2.1 billion. The community would raise roughly $700 million through the Ottawa Hospital Foundation’s campaign, plus revenue such as parking and retail fees. The City of Ottawa was asked for $150 million, the largest funding request it had ever received.

That model no longer matches the numbers being discussed. Several things are unresolved:

  • Does the province absorb the whole increase? The minister’s figure suggests the provincial share has grown enormously, but the ministry has not said whether the local share is fixed at its original amount or grows too.
  • What happens to the local share? If it grows in proportion, the foundation cannot close the gap through donations alone, which leaves the question of whether municipal property taxpayers are asked to contribute more.
  • What will the new council decide? The $150 million request sits with the council elected on Oct. 26. The mayor has drawn a line against open-ended additional costs, but there is no published proposal on what the city would or would not fund.

In the end, every dollar comes from taxpayers.
Whether it comes through the provincial treasury, which Ottawa residents also fund, or through the city’s property tax base is the open question, and it is one the public is entitled to see answered with a real budget.

What to watch for

  • A published, itemized total project cost and the reason for each change from $2.8 billion.
  • The updated construction and opening schedule, expected in the coming months.
  • A staff report to the new council on the city’s contribution.
  • A clear statement from the province on how it splits any increase with the local share.

One piece of the project is physically done. The parking garage, built first so crews had somewhere to park, was expected to open this summer. The hospital itself is the part still without a final price.

Sources

Ottawa’s Forecasting Problem: The Numbers Keep Missing

Ottawa’s Forecasting Problem: The Numbers Keep Missing

Libraries, light rail, a stadium, a transit system and now a hospital. The City of Ottawa’s capital and operating forecasts have missed again and again, and the pattern matters more than any single project.

The question on the new Civic Campus is why a $2.8 billion project turned into a number the minister puts near $10 billion for the province alone. But Ottawa has seen this movie before. Looking across the city’s own major projects and its transit operating budget, the same thing keeps happening. A number is announced to win approval, and a different number arrives later.

Capital: the first number is rarely the last

ProjectOriginal figureLater figureChangeWhat was said about why
Ādisōke central library $192.9M (2018, including parking) $352M (latest request) About +82% Construction-market inflation, higher bids, delays, and later oversight and contingency needs
LRT Stage 2 $3.6B (early estimate); $4.66B at 2019 approval Over $5B in the 2026 draft budget About +39% or more from the early estimate; 7% or more since approval Delays, legal fees, claims and contingency top-ups. Council has topped it up at least twice.
Lansdowne 2.0 $332.6M (2022 concept-level estimate) $419M (Nov. 2023); auditor general said $493.4M (2024); approved at $418.8M (2025) About +26% from concept to approved figure Auditor general: cost estimate “optimistic” and contingency too thin
Civic Campus (hospital and province, not the city) $2.8B total; $2.1B provincial Minister says provincial investment is nearly $10B; ministry would not corroborate About 4.7 times the provincial share, if accurate Minister cited supply chains. No updated total has been published.

Percentages are my arithmetic from the figures in the linked reports. Lansdowne 2.0 is the closest to a counter-example: the city’s director of infrastructure services told councillors in 2026 that it is on schedule and within budget. The auditor general’s higher figure has not so far been borne out.

Officials gave explanations that are partly fair. On the library, the city said the increase came from factors staff could not have predicted, and the report blamed construction inflation running well above what was assumed. On Lansdowne, Mayor Sutcliffe made the point that the $419 million figure was an estimate, and so was the auditor’s. These are reasonable observations about uncertainty. But they raise the real question. If estimates are uncertain, why are they presented to council as single numbers?

Operating: revenue assumptions that didn’t hold

The operating side shows the same habit, most clearly at OC Transpo, where budgets assumed ridership and fare revenue that did not materialize.

ItemForecast or assumptionWhat happened
OC Transpo 2025 result Staff anticipated a $36M deficit going in Projected at $46.6M mid-year; $52M at year-end, with fare revenue $20.2M below budget, up from $25M in 2024
How the 2025 gap was covered Provincial and federal funding expected It did not arrive; the city drew $44.9M from its tax stabilization reserve and $7M from the transit reserve
Long-term ridership and fares 2019 long-term financial plan assumed a much stronger recovery Staff said in 2023 that 25-year fare revenue would be $3.7B lower and pre-pandemic ridership would not return until 2030
2026 ridership Pre-2030 recovery path Ridership averaged 67% of pre-pandemic levels in January to June; a $12.35M deficit is forecast

The rest of the city came in better. In 2025, tax-supported programs finished with a $31.9M surplus, and without the transit shortfall the city’s overall result would have been a $15M surplus. The problem is concentrated, not general.

Note the sequence. In 2023 staff reset the ridership outlook and said recovery would take until 2030. Two years later fare revenue was still short of budget by $20 million, and in 2026 ridership is still around two-thirds of the pre-pandemic level. A forecast that gets reset and then misses again is a forecast with an optimism problem, not a one-time shock.

Why it matters

  • Decisions are made on the first number. Councils approve projects against an initial estimate. By the time a higher figure arrives, the site is excavated and the alternatives are gone. Staff have said as much: with a project well advanced, there is little choice but to finish.
  • Overruns crowd out other spending. Every added dollar on one project is a dollar the city cannot put toward roads, recreation or transit service, or a reason to raise taxes.
  • Tax targets sit uneasily with weak forecasts. Council sets a headline property tax target before departments finish building their budgets. When revenue assumptions miss, as at OC Transpo, the gap is covered from reserves or later increases.

What better forecasting would look like

These are process changes, not a position on any particular project:

  • Present estimates as ranges, with the estimate class and the contingency stated, and not as a single figure.
  • Compare each project against completed comparable projects, so that the history of overruns informs the starting number.
  • Get an independent cost review before council votes, not after, as happened with Lansdowne.
  • Publish one annual page comparing every major forecast with the actual result.
  • Give revenue forecasts, including transit fares, a stated downside case and the reserves that would be used if it occurs.

The hospital is the next test

The Civic Campus design is, according to the hospital, complete, and its costs are still being finalized. Whatever number emerges, the useful questions are the same as above. What range was the original $2.8 billion based on? What changed, line by line? And who is on the hook for the difference? Ottawa’s record says to ask before the shovels are in the ground, not after.

Sources

#593 I said the numbers would move. They moved.

I said the numbers would move. Boy did they move.

I take no joy from any of this.

In July I wrote that the new Civic Campus belonged on the list of off-balance-sheet pressures facing the next council. The city had been asked for up to $150 million as part of a roughly $700 million local share on an original $2.8 billion total. Staff were still finalizing design, cost, and schedule. The parking garage was advancing; the hospital proper was not. Opening was already expected to slip into the 2030s. Cost-escalation risk was obvious. That $150 million (or higher) was not yet a recorded liability, but it was a known claim on future tax and rate revenue that would compete with everything else.

I was running for Ward 13. The post was one of several that treated the hospital the same way I treated the library, LRT Stage 2, Lansdowne, and the rest: as a number that had been presented, and a number that was likely to change.

During the campaign the main mayoral candidates, when they addressed the hospital at all, stayed inside the old frame. The hospital is needed. Health care is a provincial responsibility. The city will look at a detailed request if one arrives. They did not highlight the escalation risk or the delay risk that was already visible in the public record. They did not fold the ask into the broader stack of claims on the same limited revenue streams. That was a choice.

This week the provincial infrastructure minister told a legislative committee that the province is now investing “just shy of $10 billion” in the project. That is roughly 4.7 times the original $2.1 billion provincial share. The Ministry of Health has not confirmed the figure. The hospital says design is complete and that timelines and costs are still being finalized. No updated total project cost has been published. An MPP estimated that a proportional local share would now sit between roughly $2.25 billion and $2.5 billion. The foundation has raised about $404 million of its $500 million goal. The mayor has said the city will not cover “billions and billions” in added cost.

The $10 billion number was not available before voting. The pattern was.

Item What was public before election day What is public now
Total project cost $2.8 billion (original) No official update published
Provincial share $2.1 billion Minister: just shy of $10 billion
Local share ~$700 million Unconfirmed; one estimate $2.25–2.5 billion if proportional
City ask Up to $150 million (2022) Still pending; mayor drawing a line against open-ended overruns
Opening Originally 2028 Critics and project advisors: well into the 2030s
Construction status Site preparation; main building not started Same, with contracts still being finalized

This is the same sequence Ottawa has seen on other files going as far back as the Rideau Canal and Colonel By. A number is used to secure approval or to keep a project moving. A different number arrives later.
Explanations are offered: supply chains, development charges, complexity, inflation. Some of those explanations are fair. They do not change the arithmetic or the fact that the first number is the one that shapes the political conversation.

I flagged the risk in July because the risk was already in the documents. The documents have not become kinder since then. Every additional dollar still comes from taxpayers—whether through the provincial treasury (which Ottawa residents also fund) or through the city’s property-tax base. The open questions are the same ones that were open before the election: the published total, the split between provincial and local shares, the schedule, and whether the city will be asked for more than the original $150 million.

The next council will receive a staff report on the city’s contribution. An updated total and timeline are expected in the coming months. Those documents will either confirm the pattern or break it. I will read them either way.

I take no joy from the increase. The hospital is still needed. The costs are still real. The forecasting habit is still the same one I wrote about months ago.

i
Shown left, the Wuhan Hospital, precovid, built in two weeks.

Thursday, 29 October 2026

#591 Loire River By Hase Pino Tandem

 You think it might be nice, but its much, much nicer than you think.

Groovey Chambourg Castle
(How I spent my summer vacation)

Igor from Loca pino
(Click on the image if you want the low down)


Backside of Chambourg
Sunset at SAVONIERRE 

Shadows on a medieval stone wall
French cobble
Our ride..Hase Pino, rare as hen's teeth in Canada

A bit like riding along the Ottawa River, only with castles and chateauxs, cafes, and medieval historical monuments, vineyards, orchards and troglodite caves.

7 DAY Itinerary

1. START Meung
2. Chambourg
3.Cheverny
4.Blois
5. Savonierres
6. Tours
7. FINISH Anger


SAUMUR

Abbaie de Fonteraud (1100 ad)


More Savonierres

Cathedral Tours

Tours old town


CHATEAU CHEVERNY




#590 Art Battle...live artists at the Overflow Pub Friday night Oct. 30th

 I may be there tomorrow night if you are interested in a meet up.





Here are some of my previous paintings.