Campaign Video

Https://youtu.be/zBxbnuPAazE

Tuesday, 18 August 2026

Recommendations to The OPS Board


We Want Officers Who Show Initiative. We Also Need to Know Where It Stops.

Posted to the campaign blog — Rideau-Rockcliffe, Ward 13

There's a version of "police discretion" everyone actually wants: an officer notices something wrong and follows it, instead of waiting to be told. Nobody runs for council on the platform of "less initiative, please." So when a case comes along where the Ottawa Police Service disciplined an officer for exactly that kind of self-directed digging, it's worth asking honestly whether the Service overreacted — or whether the case reveals something the Ottawa Police Services Board still hasn't fixed.

The case

Between June 2020 and January 2022, then-Detective Helen Grus of the Ottawa Police Service's Sexual Assault and Child Abuse unit accessed the Records Management System files of nine infant or child death cases she wasn't assigned to, without logging her involvement. In January 2022, she called the father of one deceased infant to ask about the mother's COVID-19 vaccination status — without the lead detective's knowledge. She said she'd noticed what looked like a doubling or tripling of infant deaths and believed the pattern warranted scrutiny of a possible vaccine link.

A three-year Police Services Act disciplinary hearing found her guilty of discreditable conduct in March 2025. The hearing officer, retired Superintendent Chris Renwick, found the investigation had "no checks and balances, no consultation with the coroner or medical community," and was undertaken "without the knowledge or authorization" of the Service. The Ottawa Police Services Board separately settled a related privacy complaint with one of the affected families.

Grus's defence argued something the Board should sit with: several officers, including detectives and a sergeant, testified under oath that ad hoc access to RMS files for police-related reasons is common practice. Her lawyer pointed out that neither the Police Services Act nor OPS policy actually defines what an "unauthorized project" is. The tribunal ultimately found her conduct crossed a line — but it drew that line after the fact, in a three-year hearing, not from a standard that existed beforehand.

Why "more initiative" isn't the fix, and neither is "less"

The instinct to defend initiative is correct in general. Rule-bound, checklist-only policing has its own well-documented failure mode: officers who see something and don't act because it wasn't formally assigned to them. But this case isn't really a story about initiative being punished. It's a story about the absence of a written line between:

  • a detective noticing something in the course of her own casework and following it further, and
  • a detective building a freestanding, unlogged investigation into a subject — vaccine safety — that isn't a policing mandate at all, using police database access and police authority to pursue it.

Good initiative stays visible: it gets logged, and it gets reported up so the organization can catch errors or redirect it. What made this case costly wasn't the underlying question Grus wanted answered — it was that nine files were accessed with no record of why, and a grieving father was contacted with no one else in the loop. The risk of being wrong landed entirely on families who had no say in it.

What I'd recommend to the Ottawa Police Services Board

  1. Define "unauthorized" in writing. If officers themselves can't agree under oath on what counts as authorized access, the Board is enforcing a standard that only exists in hindsight. A written test — assigned case, same-day logged self-assignment with a stated reason, or supervisor notification within a fixed window — replaces "we'll know it when we see it" with something an officer can actually check against before acting.
  2. Separate the access question from the investigation question. Pulling a file to check something in the course of legitimate police work is a different act than opening an entirely new line of investigation. The first should be easy and just require logging. The second — anything that amounts to a self-initiated investigation — should require a formal self-assignment or escalation step, precisely because it's the kind of action that puts public trust on the line.
  3. Make logging structural, not optional. Most of the harm here came from access that was never recorded. RMS access to sensitive case categories — death investigations especially — should require a reason code at the point of access. That removes the need to trust an officer's memory or discretion after the fact, and it's exactly the kind of audit trail the Auditor General has already flagged as "not robust."
  4. Build a real channel for "I don't trust my direct chain on this." Grus said she felt she couldn't raise her concerns internally because of a unit-level directive not to discuss the topic. Whether or not that's a fair account of what happened, a Board serious about wanting initiative — rather than silence or freelancing — needs a documented escalation path outside an officer's immediate chain of command for exactly this situation.
  5. Use anomaly detection on access logs, not just after-the-fact discipline. Pattern-based auditing of database access is a solved problem in other law enforcement contexts and isn't expensive next to the cost of a three-year tribunal. It also catches problems while they're still small, rather than after nine families have already been affected.

The point

None of this is about wanting officers to do less. It's about making sure the initiative we say we want comes with a visible trail and a defined ceiling — so an officer who's right gets vindicated quickly, and an officer who's wrong gets caught before the damage is done, not three years and one privacy settlement later.

References

  • CBC News, "Ottawa police detective found guilty of discreditable conduct" (March 26, 2025) — cbc.ca
  • CTV News Ottawa, "Ottawa police officer accused of accessing police databases in death of infant and child cases" (Nov 23, 2024) — ctvnews.ca
  • CTV News Ottawa, "Ottawa police Det. Helen Grus found guilty of discreditable conduct" (March 25, 2025) — ctvnews.ca
  • Western Standard, "Ottawa detective found guilty after investigating possible connection between child deaths and COVID vax" (March 26, 2025) — westernstandard.news
  • Yahoo News Canada, "Ottawa detective found guilty of discreditable conduct over unauthorized child-death investigations" (March 25, 2025) — ca.news.yahoo.com
  • Ottawa Police Service, "Decision with Reasons — Det. Grus" disciplinary hearing decision (posted March 25, 2025) — ottawapolice.ca (PDF)
  • CBC News, "Detective tried to uncover vaccine status of dead children's parents, sources say" — cbc.ca
  • Ottawa Police Service Board, "Report to Ottawa Police Service Board" (quality assurance / policy development activity, April 22, 2024) — pub-ottawa.escribemeetings.com (PDF)
  • Ottawa Police Services Board, Policy Manual (April 2026) — ottawapoliceboard.ca (PDF)

#434 Rideau-Rockcliffe top ten list

The Next Ten Big Things – Ottawa & Ward 13 (2026–2030)

The next ten big things

Ottawa & Ward 13 (Rideau‑Rockcliffe) – 2026 to 2030
๐Ÿ“… 18 August 2026 ✍️ Peter Karwacki ๐Ÿท️ Ottawa • Ward 13 • Policy • Future

Based on current events and emerging trends, here are the ten biggest issues that will shape Ottawa and my ward, Rideau‑Rockcliffe, over the next four years. From transit shutdowns to housing pressures, infrastructure debt to climate adaptation – these are the challenges and opportunities that demand our attention.

๐Ÿ™️ Ottawa & Rideau‑Rockcliffe – change is coming

1. ๐Ÿš‡ St‑Laurent LRT station shutdown & transit reliability

A major crisis for Ward 13: the St‑Laurent LRT station must close for extensive repairs. The tunnel, originally built for buses in the 1980s, suffers from severe structural decay – corroded metal framing and crumbling concrete.

  • Impact: 11–13 months of repairs, including 5–6 weeks of a full, dual‑track closure that will halt service in both directions.
  • Timeline: Design targeted for December 2027, construction finishing no earlier than December 2029.
  • Context: A blow to the “Transit‑Oriented Development” zone, where thousands of new housing units were approved based on the promise of reliable rapid transit. Refer to my artical on this project

2. ๐Ÿ  Housing & homelessness crisis

Affordability and homelessness remain the top concerns for Ottawa residents – and Ward 13 is no exception.

  • Hotel expense: In 2025, the city spent $29.3 million housing over 660 families in hotels – an expense that “buys nothing that lasts”.
  • Waitlist: Over 16,000 households are on the social housing waiting list (end of 2025). The city aims for 5,000 new affordable units by 2030 but has built only 466 in the first three years.

3. ๐Ÿ’ฐ Crushing fiscal pressures & the infrastructure gap

The new mayor and council inherit a city with daunting financial liabilities.

  • Off‑the‑books liabilities: An infrastructure gap in the “double digits of billions”, plus an OMERS pension shortfall not fully reflected on the city’s balance sheet.
  • Lansdowne 2.0 debt: The $418.8 million redevelopment carries a debt load of over $16 million a year, despite promises of no taxpayer risk.
  • Runaway transit costs: LRT expansion is driving costs beyond what the city “didn’t fully anticipate and can’t handle”.

4. ๐Ÿš” Public safety & policing challenges

Crime and public safety are rising concerns, with notable increases in certain offenses.

  • Property crime: Ottawa police reported a 28% increase in property crimes in 2026 compared to the previous year.
  • Clearance rates: The robbery clearance rate in Ward 13 was cut in half in one year – from 42.4% to 20.0% – highlighting capacity issues.
  • Police budget deficit: The Ottawa Police Service is projected to face a deficit of at least $20 million in 2026.

5. ๐ŸŒณ Climate change adaptation

The city has launched “Climate Ready Ottawa”, a new five‑year action plan (2026–2030) to prepare for climate impacts.

  • Focus: Protecting people, infrastructure, and essential services from flooding, extreme heat, and severe weather.
  • Investment: Seven priority programs will guide investments in flood resilience, cooling amenities, and extreme weather preparedness.

6. ๐Ÿ“‰ Economic uncertainty & slow growth

Ottawa’s economy faces short‑term pressures with modest growth expectations.

  • GDP: The Ottawa‑Gatineau region’s real GDP is projected to increase by only 1.4% in 2026.
  • Job losses: Recent data shows Ottawa “experienced the largest employment loss”. However, emerging opportunities exist in defence, cybersecurity, and semiconductors.

7. ๐Ÿ›️ New council dynamics & governance

The 2026 municipal election brings a new mayor and many new councillors – a chance for significant change.

  • Key question: Will the new council move beyond political theatre and focus on structural fixes like accountability, oversight, and the vast infrastructure deficit?
  • Ward‑level impact: Councillor Rawlson King often finds himself on the losing side of key votes as part of a progressive minority – this dynamic will shape Ward 13’s influence and priorities.

8. ๐ŸŒ‰ Major interprovincial bridge construction

Work on the bridges connecting Ottawa and Gatineau will cause major traffic disruptions.

  • Macdonald‑Cartier Bridge: Work started in June 2026 and will continue into 2027.
  • Alexandra Bridge replacement: Construction on this 120‑year‑old bridge is expected to begin in 2028.
  • New “sixth” bridge: The NCC has approved design principles, but construction remains years away – final design targeted for 2029.

9. ๐Ÿšธ Ward 13 road safety improvements

Several road safety projects funded by the province will be implemented in Ward 13.

  • Projects: Traffic calming measures – speed display signs, thermoplastic markings, and speed bumps – on St. Laurent Blvd., Crichton St., Queen Mary St., and Donald St.
  • Deadline: All projects must be completed by March 31, 2028.

10. ๐Ÿ—️ Intensified development & gentrification pressures

Ward 13 – with its mix of affluent and working‑class neighbourhoods – will face intense development pressure.

  • Push for density: More moderate‑income and supportive housing units are sought, but balanced against concerns over renovictions and gentrification.
  • Recent approvals: A nearly 1,770‑unit, six‑tower development was approved near the St‑Laurent station in 2025 – a clear sign of the scale of change to come.

Looking ahead – These ten issues are deeply interconnected. The decisions made by the new city council over the next four years will be critical in determining how Ottawa and Ward 13 navigate this period of significant change. From transit reliability to housing affordability, fiscal discipline to climate resilience, there is no shortage of work ahead. But with the right focus and accountability, we can build a more sustainable and inclusive future.

Originally published on peterkarwacki.blogspot.com · Based on current events and future trends as of August 2026.

#Ottawa #Ward13 #RideauRockcliffe #MunicipalPolitics #Infrastructure #Housing #Climate

Ottawa's Next Four Years — Ten Forces to Watch

Civic Accountability Dossier · Ward 13

Ten Forces That Will
Shape Ottawa Before
the Next Election

A four-year outlook grounded in current budgets, staff reports, and the trend lines already in motion — independent of who wins in October.

Every campaign promises a vision. Fewer point to the forces already moving whether or not any candidate touches them. Here are the ten that will define Ottawa's next term — with the ones landing hardest on Ward 13 flagged below.

01Economy

The federal workforce keeps shrinking

The National Capital Region's federal headcount has already dropped by thousands in a single year, with Ottawa posting the steepest job losses of any Ontario city. This is the economic current under nearly everything else on this list — tax base, transit ridership, housing demand, downtown vacancy.

02Budget

A dedicated infrastructure levy gets seriously considered

Staff have floated a new property tax levy to chip away at a repair backlog that current plans only partly cover, against an annual funding gap that could approach $230 million. Expect this fight to define at least one budget cycle.

03Transit

LRT reliability stays unresolved, not fixed

Wheel-bearing failures, single-car service, and a fleet still catching up to demand keep transit as one of the most contested files at City Hall — regardless of who's making the case for it.

04Ward 13
Ward 13 File

The St-Laurent tunnel moves from warning to construction

Years after engineers flagged an urgent structural risk, funding and tendering are finally catching up. Bus-bridging, construction disruption, and public pressure on the station sitting inside Ward 13 will land on whoever holds this seat.

05Housing

Delivery keeps missing its own targets

Announced housing partnerships continue to move slower than the units they promise, while the count of residents in chronic homelessness keeps climbing — a trend now colliding with a new wave of federal layoffs.

06Finance

Lansdowne 2.0's financing gets its first real test

With its anchor tenant gone, the "no taxpayer risk" promise that carried the project through council faces its first genuine stress test just as a new term begins.

07Governance

Strong-mayor powers get used — or visibly restrained

How the next mayor wields (or limits) provincially granted strong-mayor authority will shape how much real oversight individual councillors retain, Ward 13's included.

08Oversight

Police board accountability keeps surfacing

Auditor findings on reporting accuracy and budget tracking at the Police Services Board point to a structural gap, not a one-term issue — one the next council inherits either way.

09Ward 13
Ward 13 File

Flooding keeps finding the same streets

West Rockcliffe and Manor Park's combined-sewer legacy makes them structurally exposed to storm-driven flooding that's now recurring rather than exceptional — a hard infrastructure fact no election changes on its own.

10Technology

Municipal AI adoption outruns municipal AI governance

City departments are already using AI tools faster than council has built disclosure or audit standards for them — a genuinely new-term problem, not a legacy one.

#433 Meaningful Feedback


 I got this unsolicited feedback from a passerby:


I wanted to send a quick note to express my sincere encouragement for your campaign in Ward 13 (Rideau-Rockcliffe). Our brief conversation left a strong impression on me, particularly when you mentioned that your primary motivation isn't merely winning the seat, but rather ensuring that residents are given a meaningful opportunity to openly discuss the real issues that impact their day-to-day lives.

Obviously this is encouraging since it is exactly what I am all about.

In ward 13, the incumbent always wins. The dice are loaded. In the city of Ottawa, last election, of the over 100 challengers exactly none were successful.

I am asking you to inform yourselves, vote differently and vote wisely for Peter Karwacki for Rideau Rockcliffe.


Peter 

# 432 Bill 60 - Bike lanes on St.Laurent should be safe



Bill 60 does not remove the councillor’s ability to advance the broader St. Laurent Transit Priority Corridor, but it complicates the delivery of the segregated cycle tracks residents expect. 

The ward councillor’s effectiveness will be measured by how well they communicate the constraints, secure the best possible compliant designs, advocate for local flexibility, and keep the overall project moving.

This election vote for a councillor that actually cycles. 

Vote differently, vote wisely, vote for Peter Karwacki for Rideau Rockcliffe 

Monday, 17 August 2026

#431 LRT - How we got here from there

Ottawa City Council — Full LRT Vote History (2006–2021)

Ottawa City Council — Recorded Votes on LRT/O-Train, 2006–2021

Includes every publicly reported council-level tally found on the O-Train / Confederation Line / Trillium Line file, from the original north-south cancellation through the post-launch inquiry decisions. Mayor column shows who was in the chair at the time. Where news coverage didn't report individual names, only the tally is shown.

Full Table

Date Mayor Matter Result Named / notable votes
July 12, 2006 Bob Chiarelli Award north-south LRT contract to Siemens/PCL/Dufferin ($778M) 14 – 7 Not individually reported
Dec 14, 2006 Larry O'Brien (newly elected, chaired meeting) Cancel the north-south LRT contract 13 – 11 (to cancel) Coun. Peggy Feltmate (Barrhaven at the time) voted against cancelling; general council split on suburban/urban lines
Feb 23, 2007 Larry O'Brien Motion by Coun. Diane Deans to reconsider/reinstate the cancelled contract Motion cancelled before a vote was held Deans tabled it; withdrawn after O'Brien released a poll showing weak public support for revival
2010 Larry O'Brien Endorse functional design for new east-west LRT line Reported as "council endorses" — no tally found
2011 Jim Watson Accelerate east-west LRT construction timeline (target: 2017) No tally found in coverage reviewed
Dec 19, 2012 Jim Watson Approve Confederation Line (Stage 1) — $2.13B fixed-price contract to Rideau Transit Group 24 – 0 Unanimous; no dissent recorded
Feb 2017 Jim Watson Approve implementation plan / project definition for Stage 2 ($3.6B expansion) No named tally found Preceded June 2017 federal funding announcement
Mar 6, 2019 Jim Watson Award Stage 2 contracts (East-West Connectors + TransitNEXT/SNC-Lavalin) — $4.66B total 19 – 3 Against: Coun. Diane Deans, Coun. Rick Chiarelli, Coun. Shawn Menard. Coun. Catherine McKenney's motion to delay the vote to Mar. 27 was defeated separately.
Oct 13, 2021 Jim Watson Call a judicial (judge-led) inquiry into Stage 1 procurement/launch (McKenney motion) 10 – 13 (motion failed) Watson and 12 councillors voted against; McKenney was the sponsor and a "yes"
Oct 13, 2021 Jim Watson Procedural ruling on how to handle Gower's replacement motion vs. McKenney's inquiry motion (challenge to Chair) 11 – 11 tie (ruling sustained; tie goes to chair) Diane Deans challenged Watson's procedural ruling; her mic was cut mid-argument (Watson later apologized)
Oct 13, 2021 Jim Watson Refer Confederation Line investigation to city Auditor General instead (Gower motion) 14 – 9 Moved by Coun. Glen Gower; supported by Watson

Not full council recorded votes (context only)

DateEvent
2019–2022Justice William Hourigan led a provincially-called public inquiry (not a council vote) into Stage 1's problems, reporting in late 2022/2023
Jan 29, 2025Council approved dissolving the Light Rail Subcommittee created after the public inquiry report (tally not reported in coverage reviewed)

Gaps marked "no tally found" reflect what turned up in the news coverage reviewed, not necessarily an absence of a recorded vote — Ottawa's official council minutes (ottawa.ca) or Horizon Ottawa's Vote Tracker (2022–2026 term only) would have complete roll calls if you need to fill these in, especially the 2010, 2011, and Feb 2017 votes.

The Nail That Sticks Up — Conformity on Ottawa's LRT File

The Nail That Sticks Up

Conformity, dissent, and Ottawa's LRT file — a voting-record summary

Over nearly two decades and more than a dozen recorded council votes, Ottawa's LRT file shows a consistent pattern: as costs rose and problems mounted, the number of councillors willing to vote no barely moved. Council approved the original Confederation Line unanimously. It approved the ballooned $4.66-billion Stage 2 contract with only three dissenters. And even after years of delays, a public derailment, and mounting evidence of trouble, a motion for a judicial inquiry still failed. The story isn't that council was fooled once — it's that almost nobody was willing to be the one name standing alone against the file, meeting after meeting.

"Nobody wanted to be the nail that sticks up."

The Record

Date Matter Result Who stood alone / stood apart
Jul 2006 Award original north-south LRT contract 14 – 7 Not individually reported
Dec 2006 Cancel that contract under new mayor O'Brien 13 – 11 (to cancel) Genuinely close — the one vote in the whole file where council was actually split
Dec 2012 Approve Confederation Line (Stage 1), $2.13B 24 – 0 Unanimous. Not one councillor on record with a concern.
Mar 2019 Award Stage 2 contracts, $4.66B (up $1.2B in weeks, contracts not seen by council before the vote) 19 – 3 Deans, Rick Chiarelli, Menard voted no. Several "yes" votes were cast by councillors who said openly they didn't have the facts.
Oct 2021 Judicial inquiry into Stage 1 failures (McKenney motion) 10 – 13 (defeated) Failed even after two derailments and years of public dysfunction. Watson voted with the majority to block it.
Oct 2021 Procedural ruling on how to handle the inquiry motion 11 – 11 tie Broken by the mayor's chair vote. Deans's mic was cut mid-challenge.
Oct 2021 Refer investigation to Auditor General instead of a judge 14 – 9 The softer, lower-accountability option won out

What the Pattern Suggests

  • Dissent never became a majority. Across every recorded vote on this file, from 2012 onward, the "no" side topped out at 10 votes — and only once, in the very first cancellation fight, was council actually split down the middle.
  • The dissenters were a small, repeat cast. Diane Deans, Catherine McKenney, Shawn Menard, and Rick Chiarelli account for most of the recorded opposition on cost and oversight. The rest of council moved as a bloc, vote after vote, regardless of what had changed on the file since the last one.
  • Unanimity at the start set the tone. A 24-0 vote in 2012 meant there was no dissenting voice on record to point back to later — no one who could say "I told you so" with a paper trail. That silence at the outset may have made it harder for anyone to break ranks once problems appeared.
  • When accountability was finally on the table, council chose the weaker mechanism. Faced with a choice between a judge-led inquiry and a staff-directed audit, council chose the audit — the option with less independence and less power to compel testimony — by a wider margin than it rejected the inquiry.
  • Procedure did some of the work opinion wouldn't. The one moment the vote was genuinely even (11-11), it wasn't decided by debate — it was decided by the mayor's tie-breaking power, with a councillor's microphone cut mid-objection.

Gaps: the 2010 functional-design endorsement, 2011 timeline-acceleration vote, and Feb 2017 Stage 2 implementation approval didn't have individually reported tallies in the coverage this summary draws on. Ottawa's official council minutes or Horizon Ottawa's Vote Tracker (2022–2026 term) would fill in specifics if needed, particularly for any votes cast by current-term councillors.

Sources: CBC News, Global News, Ottawa Magazine, CTV News, CPTDB Wiki, Horizon Ottawa Vote Tracker.

#430 How's that working for you?


Bathgate Park 


Bathgate Park needs the Riveraine treatment

Ottawa Passed an Anti-Racism Strategy. But is it Working?

Three years in, the City has plenty to say about activities completed and almost nothing to say about results.

In June 2022, Ottawa City Council approved a five-year Anti-Racism Strategy with seven priority areas, 28 recommendations, 132 actions, and a dedicated Anti-Racism Secretariat. Phase 1 (2023–2025) focused on internal awareness, training, and race-based data collection. That is a reasonable starting point. The problem is the absence of any published evaluation framework that shows whether the strategy is changing the outcomes it was meant to improve.

What the City Can Point To

A Secretariat was created and staffed. Consultation occurred with the Community Anti-Racism Advisory Table and racialized residents. Institutional infrastructure exists. Infrastructure, however, is not evidence of impact. Three years later, “we built a data process” remains the main answer to “what changed,” and that process has yet to yield public trend reports.

Hate-Crime Numbers Are the Wrong Metric

Ottawa Police hate-crime reports are the default proxy. They show a sharp rise followed by a recent drop:

YearOttawa Reports
2019116
2020181
2021340
2022377
2023487
2024467
2025358

The 2023 peak aligned with the Israel-Gaza conflict and national spikes in antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents. Online reporting (2017) and a dedicated hate-crime unit (2020) also increased reporting independent of underlying trends. National figures followed a similar pattern:

YearCanada Reports
20213,355
20223,612
20234,828
20244,841
20254,708

Ottawa’s 2024 rate (27.7 per 100,000) remained well above peer cities and the national average (Toronto 20.1, Vancouver 14.9, Montrรฉal 10.9, Canada 11.9). These counts cannot answer whether the strategy is working; the City has not supplied a better instrument.

Better Data Shows a Persistent Gap

National surveys paint a clearer, mixed picture. The Canadian Race Relations Foundation / Environics series (2019–2024) finds improved perceptions: 68 % of Canadians now describe race relations as generally good. Yet the share who report personally experiencing racial discrimination has stayed roughly constant at about one in four since 2019.

Statistics Canada data are consistent: 45 % of racialized Canadians reported racism or discrimination in the past five years; 81 % of those experienced it more than once. Attitudes have softened; lived experience has not. An evaluation framework is supposed to surface exactly this gap. “We launched a strategy” does not.

Ownership Is Clear

Councillor Rawlson King (Ward 13) has been Council Liaison for Anti-Racism and Ethnocultural Relations since 2020. His biography states he was responsible for creating the Anti-Racism Secretariat and “currently leads the implementation” of the strategy. Claiming credit for standing it up is fair. Ownership of the missing evaluation framework is equally clear.

What Needs to Happen Before Phase 2

  • Publish the evaluation framework immediately, with defined outcome metrics.
  • Separate activity counts (trainings, data points collected) from outcome measures (changes in self-reported discrimination and priority-area results) in every public report.
  • Commission independent third-party evaluation.
  • Tie Phase 2/3 funding to published results.

If the City spends public money and claims progress, residents are owed a transparent way to check the claim. That standard applies throughout City Hall. It applies especially when the councillor leading the file seeks re-election on its strength.

Sources

Ottawa Police Service annual hate-crime releases (2019–2025); Statistics Canada police-reported hate-crime tables and Daily releases; Canadian Race Relations Foundation / Environics Race Relations in Canada 2024 (and prior waves); Statistics Canada Survey Series on People and their Communities (2023–2024); City of Ottawa Anti-Racism Strategy documents and progress updates.

Statistics Canada Canadian Social Survey – Experiences of Discrimination (2021–2024)

Statistics Canada Canadian Social Survey
Experiences of Discrimination or Unfair Treatment (Past 5 Years)

Source: Canadian Social Survey (pooled waves collected 2021–early 2024). Target population: non-institutionalized persons aged 15+ living off-reserve in the 10 provinces. Data are self-reported and national-level (not Ottawa-specific).

Discrimination is defined as being treated unfairly due to Indigenous identity, ethnicity/culture, race/skin colour, physical appearance, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity/expression, age, disability, language, sex, accent, or other reasons, across various settings.

Overall Prevalence

Group Percentage
All people aged 15+ 36%
Racialized people 51%
Non-racialized people 27%

By Specific Population Groups

Group Percentage
Canadian-born racialized 57%
Racialized recent immigrants 48%
Racialized established immigrants (>10 years) 49%
Canadian-born Black people 71%
Recent Black immigrants 51%
Established Black immigrants 59%
Indigenous (First Nations off-reserve, Mรฉtis, Inuit) 46%
Non-Indigenous 33%
2SLGBTQ+ 61%
Non-2SLGBTQ+ 32%
People with a disability 44%
People without a disability 32%
Women 37%
Men 30%

Most Common Settings Where Discrimination Occurred

Setting Overall % Notes by Group
At work / applying for job or promotion 41% Black: 48%; other racialized: 39%; non-racialized: 41%
In a store, bank, or restaurant 33%
Using public areas (e.g., parks, sidewalks) 29%
Attending social gatherings / friends or family 22%
On the Internet / social media 18%
Attending school or classes 17% Higher among some racialized groups
Using public transit 15%
Seeing a medical professional / healthcare 13%
Seeking or applying for housing 10% Black: 13%; other racialized/non-racialized: 6%
Crossing the border into Canada 6%

Perceived Reasons for Discrimination (Selected)

  • For racialized people: Race or skin colour (66%), ethnicity or culture (49%), accent (28%), language (27%)
  • Other common reasons overall include physical appearance, age, sex, disability, sexual orientation, etc. (varying by demographic group)

Source: Statistics Canada, The Daily (16 May 2024), based on the Canadian Social Survey (survey 5354). Data reflect self-reported experiences and have remained relatively stable since 2021. A later 2023/2024 analysis reported approximately 45% of racialized Canadians experienced race/ethnicity-based discrimination in the prior five years.

Full tables, charts, and methodological notes are available on the Statistics Canada website under the referenced Daily release. No detailed city-level (Ottawa) breakdown of this survey data was identified in official releases.

Premier Ford announced that the next round of applications is open for the Community Sport and Recreation Infrastructure Fund, which offers money for sport and recreation upgrades, repairs or new builds. If elected I'd be all over that.

Sunday, 16 August 2026

#429 Layin' Pipe

Why Kilmory and Bowmoor Keep Flooding: Ottawa’s Aging Pipes vs. Modern Standards

Why Kilmory and Bowmoor Keep Flooding:
Ottawa’s Aging Pipes vs. Modern Standards

Parkwood Hills, Ward 9 (Knoxdale-Merivale) · August 2026

Residents on Kilmory Crescent and the neighbouring street Bowmoor Avenue in Ottawa’s Parkwood Hills neighbourhood have lived through the same frustrating cycle for years: heavy rain arrives, basements flood, streets turn into temporary rivers, and the cleanup begins again. The July 1, 2026 Canada Day storm was the most dramatic recent example, but it was not the first. Similar problems appeared in August 2023 and during earlier intense rainfall events.

The root cause is not mysterious. These two streets share a mid-20th-century stormwater and sanitary system that was never designed to the standards the City of Ottawa applies today.

What “Modern Standard” Actually Means

Since at least the early 2010s (formalized in the City of Ottawa Sewer Design Guidelines, October 2012 edition and later updates), Ottawa has required the dual-drainage principle for new development and major upgrades:

  • Minor system (underground pipes and catch basins): sized to carry the 2-year to 5-year storm under free-flow conditions without surcharging.
  • Major system (streets, ditches, parks and planned overland routes): sized to safely convey the 100-year storm, with strict limits on ponding depth and freeboard to building openings.

In practice, the minor system is most often designed for the 5-year event. Excess water from rarer storms is expected to travel on the surface without entering basements.

Key performance targets under current guidelines:
• Building openings must sit at least 0.30 m above the 100-year water surface elevation.
• Surface flow depth is generally limited to less than 0.35 m.
• Post-development peak flows are typically restricted to the 2-year or 5-year pre-development rate (runoff coefficient C ≤ 0.5).

How 1960s Design Differs

Parkwood Hills was largely built in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, engineers commonly sized storm sewers for a 2-year return period (or an equivalent lower standard). There was little formal requirement for a continuous, engineered major system that could handle a 100-year event. Once the pipes filled, water had nowhere planned to go except onto streets, into yards, and often into basements through foundation drains or sewer laterals.

That is why Kilmory and Bowmoor experience nearly identical flooding: they sit in the same legacy drainage catchment.

Comparative Chart: Design Criteria and Pipe Capacity Implications

Exact pipe diameters on these streets vary by catchment area and slope, but the design return period drives capacity. The table below shows the practical difference.

Design Aspect 1960s-Era System
(Parkwood Hills / Kilmory–Bowmoor)
Current Ottawa Dual-Drainage Standard
Minor-system design storm Typically 2-year return period 5-year return period (free-flow)
Major-system design storm Limited or informal overland flow 100-year return period (planned routes)
Target level of service Protection against frequent, smaller storms No basement flooding or excessive street flooding up to 100-year event
Typical intensity ratio
(short-duration storms, Ottawa IDF)
Baseline (2-year) ~1.3–1.5× higher intensity for 5-year;
~2.0–2.5× higher for 100-year
Pipe capacity implication
(Manning’s equation, same slope & roughness)
Smaller diameter sufficient for design flow Larger diameter required; capacity scales roughly with diameter8/3. A 30–50 % increase in design flow often needs a noticeably larger pipe.
Inlet control / surcharge control Rarely used Commonly required so pipes do not surcharge during the minor-system design storm
Freeboard to buildings Not systematically required Minimum 0.30 m above 100-year water level
Climate-change allowance None Often +20 % intensity applied in modern designs

Note: Actual pipe diameters on Kilmory and Bowmoor are not published in a single public inventory for every segment. The comparison above reflects the governing design criteria rather than a specific measured pipe. Capacity differences compound across an entire neighbourhood network.

What This Means for Residents

When a storm exceeds roughly the 2- to 5-year intensity—events that climate data show are becoming more common—the old pipes fill, the hydraulic grade line rises, and water seeks the path of least resistance. That path frequently leads into basements. The 2026 Canada Day storm (locally exceeding 140–160 mm in parts of the west end) simply made the deficiency obvious at city-wide scale.

Partial upgrades have occurred in some nearby streets over the years (sewer replacements and inlet controls after earlier floods), but the overall network serving Kilmory and Bowmoor has not been brought up to full dual-drainage standards.

Practical Next Steps

  • Report every flooding incident to 3-1-1 so the City’s data accurately reflects the problem.
  • Consider private protective measures (backwater valves, sump pumps with battery backup). The City’s Residential Protective Plumbing Program offers rebates for eligible homes built before certain dates.
  • Advocate, through the Ward 9 councillor’s office, for a targeted drainage study and capital upgrade of this catchment.
  • Support broader city initiatives that combine bigger pipes where needed with low-impact development (rain gardens, permeable surfaces, downspout disconnection) to reduce the volume reaching the sewers in the first place.

The infrastructure under Kilmory Crescent and Bowmoor Avenue was built to the standards of its time. Those standards are no longer adequate for the rainfall intensities Ottawa now experiences. Until the system is brought closer to today’s dual-drainage criteria, repeated flooding will remain a predictable outcome rather than a surprise.

Based on City of Ottawa Sewer Design Guidelines (2012 and updates), public flood investigation reports, and documented performance of Parkwood Hills during the 2023 and 2026 extreme rainfall events. Pipe-sizing relationships follow standard hydraulic principles (Manning’s equation). Individual property conditions vary; professional assessment is recommended for specific homes.