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Tuesday, 15 September 2026

#519 AI Goverance in Ottawa

Why Ottawa Needs Stronger AI Guardrails — And What PMI’s New Standard Offers

Governance · Municipal AI · PMI Standard

Why the City of Ottawa Needs Stronger AI Guardrails

15 September 2026 · peterKarwacki.blogspot.com
PPPMResponsible AIPublic sector

Peter Karwacki, PMP, is a certified Project Management Professional and a member of the Project Management Institute (PMI). This commentary applies PMI’s 2026 Standard for Artificial Intelligence in Portfolio, Program, and Project Management to the City of Ottawa’s expanding use of AI. It is written in a personal capacity and is not an official PMI or City of Ottawa position.

Ottawa is no longer experimenting with artificial intelligence at the margins. Thousands of city staff already use generative tools every day. Resume screening, asset mapping, homelessness-risk models, permitting pre-checks, and police investigative tools are moving from pilot to production. Productivity is real. So is the public-trust risk. The city’s existing staff guide is a start. It is not yet a full set of guardrails.

This post argues that Ottawa should treat AI as a portfolio of public projects — not a collection of helpful apps — and should adopt the kind of principle-driven, human-in-the-loop governance set out in PMI’s 2026 AI standard. That standard was written for exactly this moment: AI is being deployed through projects faster than regulation can keep up.[1]

What Ottawa is already doing

By late 2025, more than 3,200 city employees were using Microsoft Copilot. In one 30-day window they submitted more than 114,000 prompts. Staff described the tool as a way to find information and draft communications — work that, for many office roles, is most of the job.[2]

At the same time, the city disclosed or advanced several higher-stakes uses:

  • Hiring. AI-assisted resume screening for high-volume postings (including SAP Joule), where a single competition can attract hundreds of applicants.[3]
  • Geospatial work. Mobile mapping and machine learning to inventory signs, poles, and other assets.[2]
  • Social policy. A model, developed with Carleton University, that uses shelter and demographic data to help predict risk of chronic homelessness.[4]
  • Planning and housing. An AI PreCheck pilot for low-rise residential permits, checking completeness and comparing drawings to zoning and building-code rules.[5]
  • Digital twin / planning support. Scenario tools and an AI chatbot to help staff apply the new zoning bylaw.[6]
  • Policing. The Ottawa Police Service has been developing a dedicated AI policy covering facial recognition, transcription, and related tools, with explicit attention to Charter rights, privacy, and bias.[7]

City Manager Wendy Stephanson told councillors the corporation was writing a broader responsible-use framework, expected in early 2026, to sit above the existing Responsible use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) – Guide. That guide already names approved tools (Copilot Web), requires requests for non-standard tools, and sets staff principles around data security, accountability, transparency, and equity.[8]

The gap is not “Ottawa has no rules.” The gap is that a staff-facing GenAI guide plus a forthcoming corporate framework still leave high-impact systems — hiring, homelessness prediction, permitting, policing — without a published, life-cycle, project-level control model that residents can see and that managers can audit.

Why guardrails matter now, not later

Municipal AI is not a lab demo. It touches who gets a job interview, who is flagged as at risk of homelessness, how fast a housing application moves, and how police generate investigative leads. PMI’s standard is blunt about the failure modes that follow when organizations skip governance:

  • bias and discriminatory outcomes from training data and model design;
  • hallucinations and confident-but-wrong outputs;
  • privacy and consent failures when personal data is reused;
  • black-box decisions that people cannot contest;
  • diffused accountability (“the model did it”);
  • intellectual-property and records-management exposure;
  • loss of public trust when systems affect rights.

Those risks are not theoretical in Ottawa. Resume screening can encode historical hiring bias. Homelessness models use sensitive attributes (age, Indigenous identity, family status, prior service refusals). Permitting tools can quietly change who gets through the queue. Police facial recognition sits at the intersection of Charter rights and public safety. A staff guide that says “verify the output” is necessary. It is not sufficient when the output already shapes a human decision.

Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner and Human Rights Commission have jointly published principles for responsible public-sector AI precisely because privacy and equality rights travel with these systems.[9] The federal public service now has its own 2025–2027 AI strategy, built around being “ready” and “responsible.”[10] Cities that wait for perfect national legislation will still be operating the tools.

What PMI means by “guardrails”

PMI does not use the marketing word “guardrails” as a slogan. It supplies eight principles and five performance domains that function as guardrails for any organization running AI as work. The standard is technology-agnostic, human-centred, and written for portfolio, program, and project managers — which is how a city actually delivers AI: as initiatives with sponsors, budgets, vendors, risks, and close-out.[11]

The eight principles, applied to a city

PMI principle What it requires Ottawa example if it is missing
Strategic value Every AI initiative must map to a public outcome, not a vendor demo. Copilot usage volume is reported; resident-facing value is not.
Risk Treat AI-specific threats (bias, drift, hallucination, over-automation) and keep a human in the loop. Resume ranking or homelessness scoring without documented override rules.
Governance and compliance Clear owners, escalation paths, audits, and alignment with MFIPPA, human-rights law, and procurement. A staff guide without an inventory of systems or an impact-assessment gate.
People and culture Literacy, change management, and no “shadow AI.” 114,000 prompts with uneven training and no public skills plan.
Ethics and professional responsibility Fairness, transparency, explainability, and an ethics oversight body. No published municipal ethics committee for AI comparable to PMI’s model.
Stakeholder engagement Residents, unions, equity offices, and affected clients are in the loop before deployment. Homelessness model consultations promised; public register still thin.
Optimization and innovation Iterate, measure, retire tools that fail. Pilots that persist because they are already “in the stack.”
Data quality Lineage, representativeness, purpose limitation, and integrity. Shelter and HR data reused for prediction without a published data card.

Source: author’s synthesis of PMI, The Standard for Artificial Intelligence in Portfolio, Program, and Project Management (2026), Principles section.[12]

Human-in-the-loop is the non-negotiable control

PMI treats human-in-the-loop (HITL) as both a safety control and a source of value. Machines can generate options at scale. They cannot carry legal accountability, read political context, or weigh competing public values. The standard expects defined intervention triggers, escalation protocols, trained reviewers, and feedback loops — not a vague instruction to “use your judgment.” For a city, that means:

  • no automated hiring rejection without a documented human decision;
  • no homelessness-risk score used as a service gate without caseworker review;
  • no permit “fail” that cannot be explained with a cited bylaw clause;
  • no police lead generated by a model that investigators cannot audit.

An ethics oversight committee, not just a PDF

Section 7 of the PMI standard is unusually practical for a municipal reader. It calls for a multidisciplinary AI ethics oversight committee — legal, privacy, equity, operations, PPPM, and community representation — with authority to set boundaries, review vendors, demand audits, and stop a deployment. That is different from asking every employee to be their own ethics officer after they have already pasted text into Copilot.

The same section lists the ethical failure modes cities actually hit: bias and misinformation, discriminatory decision-making, unclear accountability, opacity, weak data security, hallucinations, consent failures, untraceable data sources, and intellectual-property exposure. Ottawa’s GenAI guide already flags several of these. PMI’s contribution is to put them inside a project life cycle with named owners.

Comparative chart: Ottawa versus peer cities

Most large cities are in the same awkward middle: lots of projects, thinner public governance. A minority published standalone strategies years ago. Ottawa is closer to Toronto (staff guidance plus a building policy) than to Amsterdam or Barcelona (public principles plus registers and rights language).

City Public AI strategy / policy Staff GenAI guide Algorithm register / AIA Independent or multi-stakeholder ethics body High-stakes use cases in play
Ottawa Corporate framework announced for early 2026; not a long-standing public strategy Yes (2025 GenAI Guide; Copilot approved) Not published as a resident-facing inventory Not published city-wide Hiring, Copilot at scale, mapping, homelessness model, permitting AI, police AI policy
Toronto In-house AI policy work in 2025; Digital Infrastructure Strategic Framework as foundation Yes (June 2025 GenAI guidance) Working toward municipal algorithmic impact assessment Police board AI policy since 2022; city-wide ethics body still evolving Service AI plus Toronto Police Service AI governance
New York City AI Strategy (2021) and Action Plan (2023); steering committee Yes, plus staff training actions Local Law 144 (AEDT) and public reporting culture City AI Steering Committee / OTI lead Hiring tools, service bots, agency systems
Amsterdam Intelligence Agenda; 2024 Vision on AI (human value, education, equal access) Yes Pioneer of public algorithm register Strong civic / rights framing Municipal algorithms with public documentation
Barcelona 2021 ethical algorithms-and-data strategy; 2026 investment package to deepen it Yes Rights-centred model; external advisory council on AI and digital rights Yes Recommendation systems constrained; digital-rights brand
Montréal Early Montréal Declaration for responsible AI (principles, not a binding ops manual) Varies by institution Research-heavy ecosystem (Mila) Declaration as civic reference Research and civic principles more visible than ops playbooks

Comparative judgments are based on publicly described instruments, not on unpublished internal controls.[13][14][15]

Ottawa’s current guide versus a PMI-style control set

Control Ottawa GenAI Guide (2025) PMI AI Standard (2026) expectation
Approved tools Copilot Web; exceptions via technology request Tool selection criteria: alignment, integration, scale, learning curve, cost-benefit, data control
Human responsibility Employee must verify outputs Defined HITL triggers, roles, escalation, and audit of the HITL process itself
Equity / bias Staff told not to amplify bias Fairness testing, diverse teams, periodic bias reassessment, documented remediation
Privacy Do not put non-compliant data into tools Data-quality principle plus legal considerations (consent, MFIPPA-class rules, vendor clauses)
Transparency to the public Internal education document Stakeholder engagement domain; explainability; contestability of decisions that affect rights
Oversight body Not specified in the staff guide AI ethics oversight committee with cross-functional membership and stop-the-line authority
Life cycle Use-time guidance Initiation → data prep → model/tooling → deploy → monitor → optimize → decommission, tailored into PPPM phases
Business case Implied productivity ROI, risk, ethics, regulatory fit, and long-term sustainability before scale-up

The honest reading is that Ottawa did the first-mile work well: pick a sanctioned tool, tell staff not to paste secrets, remind them they own the output. The second mile — the one that protects residents when AI is used on them, not just by staff — is where PMI’s performance domains matter: managing stakeholder expectations, defining scope, designing for quality and reliability, executing strategic goals, and managing AI-specific risk.

A practical guardrail package for Ottawa

If the city’s 2026 framework is still being socialized, it should include the following, mapped to PMI practice rather than invented from scratch.

  1. Publish an AI system inventory. Name the systems, owners, data sources, decision type (assistive vs. consequential), and whether a human can override. Amsterdam’s register is the benchmark; Toronto is moving toward impact assessment. Ottawa should not be less transparent than its peers while running more operational pilots.
  2. Classify use by harm, not by vendor. Copilot drafting a memo is not the same class as ranking job applicants or scoring homelessness risk. High-impact classes require privacy impact assessments, human-rights review, and a public plain-language notice.
  3. Stand up an ethics oversight committee with real authority. Include privacy, legal, People and Culture, Community and Social Services, Planning, ITS, labour, and community representation. Give it the power to pause a pilot. PMI’s committee model exists so ethics is not a sidebar comment in a steering deck.
  4. Hard-code HITL for consequential decisions. Write the intervention triggers. Train the reviewers. Audit whether humans actually review, or just click “accept.”
  5. Treat vendors as part of the control system. Contractual clauses on data residency, training-data use, audit rights, explainability, and liability — the legal chapter of the PMI standard is there for a reason.
  6. Measure more than prompt counts. PMI asks for leading and lagging indicators: accuracy, override rates, complaint rates, disparate impact, downtime, and whether the tool still matches the original business case. 114,000 prompts is activity. It is not value and it is not safety.
  7. Engage the people the models describe. Shelter users, job applicants, builders, and communities over-represented in administrative data should see the purpose, limits, and redress path before scale-up. The homelessness project’s planned consultations should be the rule, not a one-off.
  8. Plan decommissioning. Models drift. Vendors change terms. A city that cannot turn a system off does not control it.
Bottom line: Ottawa should keep using AI. It should not scale hiring, social-risk, permitting, or police tools on the strength of a productivity story and a staff pamphlet. Guardrails are how a capital city proves that efficiency and rights can occupy the same sentence.

Why a project-management standard is the right instrument

City AI work is already organized as projects and programs. That is PMI’s home territory. A rights charter without delivery mechanics becomes a poster. A delivery plan without ethics becomes a procurement. The 2026 standard is useful because it forces both into the same operating system: principles, performance domains, life-cycle tailoring, and legal/ethical close-out.

It also matches how Ottawa actually works. Portfolio language helps Council prioritize which AI bets deserve scarce attention. Program language helps ITS, HR, Planning, and Community and Social Services stop running parallel pilots that share data and risk. Project language gives a manager a checklist that survives a staff rotation.

None of this requires Ottawa to wait for a federal AI Act with municipal teeth. The tools are already in the building. The public already has a reasonable question: when the city uses a model to sort people or speed a legal decision, who is accountable, how do we see it, and how do we contest it?

That is what guardrails are for.

References

  1. Project Management Institute. “PMI Publishes World’s First Global Standard for AI in Project Work.” Press release, 2026. pmi.org.
  2. White-Crummey, Arthur. “City working on AI projects to speed up hiring, mapping and office work.” CBC News, 2 December 2025. cbc.ca.
  3. Dodd, Anna. “City of Ottawa is making use of AI tools like Microsoft Copilot, SAP Joule.” CompassNews, 4 December 2025. compassnews.ca.
  4. Karadeglija, Anja. “Ottawa becomes the latest city to turn to AI to help it predict chronic homelessness.” The Globe and Mail, 4 August 2024. theglobeandmail.com.
  5. Archistar. “City of Ottawa Launches AI PreCheck Pilot to Accelerate Permitting.” 1 June 2026. archistar.ai.
  6. What Works Cities. “Ottawa, Canada.” whatworkscities.bloomberg.org.
  7. “AI is coming to the Ottawa police. Here’s how they’ll use the new tech.” Ottawa Citizen, 29 March 2026. ottawacitizen.com.
  8. City of Ottawa. Responsible use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) – Guide. 2025. PDF via AMCTO.
  9. Ontario Human Rights Commission and Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. Principles for the Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence. ohrc.on.ca.
  10. Government of Canada. AI Strategy for the Federal Public Service 2025–2027. canada.ca.
  11. Walch, Kathleen. “The New AI Standard: A Shared Foundation for Responsible Adoption.” PMI Blog, 14 July 2026. pmi.org/blog.
  12. Project Management Institute. The Standard for Artificial Intelligence in Portfolio, Program, and Project Management. PMI, 2026. ISBN 978-1-62825-891-2. Principles, performance domains, human-in-the-loop guidance, and ethics oversight summarized from the published standard.
  13. Vidal D’oleo, Alexandra. “Case studies of urban AI governance frameworks.” CIDOB, 2024. cidob.org.
  14. The GovLab. “AI Localism in Action: Six Local Approaches to Governing AI.” blog.thegovlab.org.
  15. City of Toronto. Guidance for the Responsible Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence, 18 June 2025. toronto.ca PDF.

Peter Karwacki, PMP · PMI member · Written for peterKarwacki.blogspot.com. Commentary on public sources and on PMI’s published standard; principles and structure are cited, not reproduced. Not official PMI, City of Ottawa, or employer guidance.

Monday, 14 September 2026

#518 The 39% Solution



This analysis of online engagement metrics for an article tracking the Ottawa Police Services Board reveals a 39.7% like ratio, mirroring historical voter turnout in Rideau-Rockcliffe (Ward 13). This consistent participation rate highlights a structural reliance on a minority mandate for local municipal governance. For further reading on the candidates in Ward 13, visit CTV News. [1, 2]

The Ottawa Police Service: My Greatest Hits


The 39% Solution
An online sentiment check on an article breaking down the Ottawa Police Services Board reveals a striking metric: 216 likes to 327 dislikes. That works out to exactly a 39.7% approval ratio.
If that 39% number sounds familiar, it should. It is almost the exact percentage of neighbors who bother to show up and vote in Rideau-Rockcliffe municipal elections.
Look at the history for Ward 13:
  • 2019 By-election: Turnout was a city-low 37.15%.
  • 2018 Municipal Election: Turnout hit that exact same wall at 37.15%.
What we are looking at is the "39% Solution"—a structural reality where our local governance, board representation, and municipal mandate rely entirely on a minority participation rate. When the upcoming municipal election lands on October 26, 2026, the real question is whether Ward 13 will finally break past this 39% benchmark, or if we will keep letting a fraction of the ward dictate accountability for the rest of us.
For a look at who is on the ballot this time around, you can read the candidate profiles over at the CTV News Ward 13 Candidate Overview.

your one stop for links to all 24 ward debates https://peterkarwacki.blogspot.com/2026/09/rogers-debates.html?m=1

#517 PPP buses

The 40-Seat Club: A Subscription Coach From Orléans to Moodie
Ottawa transit essay

The 40-Seat Club: A Subscription Coach From Orléans to Moodie

A for-profit, reserved-seat highway service for 40 riders — or multiples of 40 — on the city’s weakest transit axis.

Ottawa already has ride-share. It is called a car with one person in it, crawling Highway 417 while empty Park & Ride lots sit in Kanata and Barrhaven. What it does not have is a reserved, highway-running seat that you pay for like a gym membership and that shows up whether OC Transpo’s transfers cooperate or not.

Call it the 40-Seat Club. One coach. Forty guaranteed seats. Orléans to Moodie Drive and back. Subscription only. Multiples of 40 when demand justifies a second or third bus.

The gap it fills

East-to-west across Ottawa is the trip the official network was not built for. Driving from Orléans to the Moodie / Kanata edge is roughly 35–45 kilometres and about 30–45 minutes off-peak.1 On transit it is still a transfer sandwich: Orléans to Blair, Line 1 through the core, then another bus west to Moodie — often 90 to 120 minutes or more.2 When Line 1 east to Trim and Line 3 west to Moodie are both open, the trip improves and remains long. Line 3’s Moodie terminus is still planned as part of the west extension, not as a service that exists today.3

Plenty of people who live in Orléans and work near Moodie, Bayshore, or the Carling campus have already decided the train-plus-bus combo is not worth it. They drive. Early September 2026 Park & Ride occupancy made the same point: rail-connected lots in the east were busy; large bus-oriented lots in the west were not.4

Table 1. Selected OC Transpo Park & Ride occupancy, Sept. 4–10, 2026
Lot Area / connection Avg. occupancy Approx. spaces
Bowesville South / O-Train Line 2 93% ~823
Place d’Orléans East / Line 1 corridor 85% 778
Leitrim South / Line 2 78% 299
Trim East 59%
Eagleson Kanata / bus 38% 1,220
Fallowfield Barrhaven / bus 30% 1,709
Innovation Kanata / bus 13% 254
Terry Fox Kanata / bus 11% ~517
Nepean Woods Barrhaven / bus 5% 287

Sources: City of Ottawa Mobility Dashboard figures reported by CTV News Ottawa, 13 Sept. 2026; lot capacities from City of Ottawa / OC Transpo Park & Ride listings.45

A 40-seat coach does not try to be a city bus. It tries to be a moving reserved parking space that happens to carry 39 other people.

How the subscription works

You buy a seat, not a single-ride ticket.

Table 2. Service rules
Element Rule
Vehicle 40-seat coach; add another 40-seat coach only when the first is sold out
Peak membership Weekday mornings east-to-west; evenings west-to-east
Flex add-on Limited opposite-direction or off-peak seats if a second run exists
Pickup Place d’Orléans and/or Trim Park & Ride
Drop Moodie station, with at most one extra west-end stop if loads justify it
Routing Highway 174 / 417. No downtown stop. No local collection.
Reservation App check-in; seat held if confirmed the night before
No-show rule More than two no-shows in a month returns the seat to the pool

Forty people is the point. Small enough that the bus feels like a product, not a lottery. Large enough that the cost per seat can undercut two cars and still pay a driver, insurance, and a coach that does not break down every other week. When 40 fills, you add another 40. You do not add a 12-seat van and call it scale.

What it costs, roughly

A serious operator would need a fare that covers full cost plus margin. OC Transpo cannot do that; most of its trips are subsidized, and system ridership in early 2026 was still around 67 percent of pre-pandemic levels against a budget assumption of 82 percent.6

Table 3. Illustrative monthly pricing (not a live offer)
Product What you get Indicative price
Peak reserved seat Guaranteed AM + PM seat, weekdays $250–$400 / month
4-day peak Same corridor, four weekdays $210–$340 / month
Flex pack 8 one-way reserved trips / month $80–$120
OC Transpo adult cash / tap Network-wide, no reserved seat $4.10–$4.15 per ride7
OC Transpo Park & Ride permit Parking only at designated lots $31 regular / $70 gold7

Subscription figures are planning ranges, not advertised fares. They exist to show the gap between a fully costed private coach and a subsidized municipal ride.

That monthly price sounds high until it is stacked against downtown or office-area parking, wear on a car, and the time tax of a 90-minute transit trip. Split across two people in a household it starts to look like a second car you do not have to own. It will never be as cheap as an OC Transpo pass. It is not trying to be. It is trying to be cheaper than driving alone and more reliable than the current crosstown scramble.

How it compares

Table 4. Orléans to Moodie, three ways
Drive OC Transpo today 40-Seat Club
Typical time 30–45 min off-peak; longer in the peak Often 90–120+ min with transfers Target: closer to driving time
Seats 1–5 Unreserved 40 reserved per coach
Transfers None Usually two or more None
Reliability pitch Traffic Subject to bus lateness and missed trips8 The whole product is the promise of a seat that exists
Who it serves Anyone with a car Anyone on the network People making the same long crosstown trip on a schedule

Why this is not Uber with extra steps

Uber-style private transportation companies in Ottawa are licensed for pre-arranged app rides. They cannot street-hail, and they are not a scheduled bus line.9 A 40-seat subscription optimizes for the same 40 people making the same trip at the same time, five days a week. The vehicle is a coach, not a Civic. The schedule is a promise, not a hope. The fare does not triple because it is raining.

It is also not “better OC Transpo.” OC Transpo has to serve every neighbourhood and every ward. Bus on-time performance was about 76 percent in August 2026, still short of the 85 percent target, and cancelled trips remain part of the product.8 This service would serve one corridor and one customer: the person who will otherwise just stay in the car.

The hard parts

Ottawa’s Transit By-law is not written to welcome a private scheduled bus that looks like transit. Operating a passenger transportation system inside the city generally requires authorization from the Director. Limited exceptions exist for things such as school buses or a private employee shuttle that is not advertised as an alternative to City transit.10 A company that advertised “Orléans–Moodie express, $X a month, open to the public” would walk into that rule. The realistic paths are a City contract, a tightly limited commuter club, or a political fight.

Demand is real but thin. Crosstown commuters exist; they are not the majority. Hybrid work means some of those 40 seats will be empty on Wednesdays. Empty backhauls kill the math unless both directions sell. And reliability has to be better than the thing it is replacing. One breakdown and the pitch — “this is the trip you can count on” — collapses.

Table 5. What would have to be true for the club to work
Condition Why it matters
Legal permission Without a City authorization or contract, a public scheduled service is likely blocked
40 peak seats sold Below that, the coach is a charity with diesel bills
Usable backhaul or cheap layover Morning westbound empties have to be paid for somehow
Spare vehicle discipline A reserved-seat product cannot miss the trip
Faster than the transfer chain If it is not close to driving time, members keep driving

Why bother anyway

Because the official network is still organized around getting people downtown, and a lot of the city’s jobs and houses are no longer organized that way. Because the empty asphalt at Eagleson and Fallowfield is a daily vote against the current bus product.4 Because a full 40-seat coach is 39 cars that do not need to be on the 417 at 7:45 a.m.

The 40-Seat Club is not a replacement for OC Transpo. It is a pressure test. If 40 people — or 80, or 120 — will pay for a reserved highway seat from Orléans to Moodie, the City learns something useful about what suburban riders will actually buy. If they will not, that is useful too. Either way, it is more honest than another round of hoping the next LRT extension and the next schedule tweak will make a crosstown trip feel like a single decision.

Forty seats. One corridor. A subscription. That is the whole idea. The rest is permission, pavement, and whether Ottawa is willing to let someone else run a bus that only does one thing well.

References

  1. Driving distances and times between Orléans / Place d’Orléans and Kanata / west-end points are commonly reported in the 25–45 km and roughly 30–45 minute off-peak range. See e.g. Rome2Rio, “Orléans to Kanata,” https://www.rome2rio.com/s/Orléans-ON-Canada/Kanata.
  2. Typical Orléans-to-core transit times via bus and Line 1 are in the 35–50 minute range before the extra westbound bus to Moodie. See Moovit and Rome2Rio itineraries from Place d’Orléans / Orléans Park & Ride toward downtown stations, and OC Transpo trip planning for Moodie connections. Moodie remains a Transitway station until Line 3 opens. OC Transpo, “Moodie,” https://www.octranspo.com/en/our-services/stations-2/moodie1.
  3. Moodie is planned as the western terminus of O-Train Line 3 as part of Stage 2 West. OC Transpo, “Moodie”; Wikipedia, “Line 3 (O-Train),” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Line_3_(O-Train).
  4. Josh Pringle, “Several OC Transpo park and ride lots at less than 50 per cent capacity as public servants return to office,” CTV News Ottawa, 13 Sept. 2026, https://www.ctvnews.ca/ottawa/article/several-oc-transpo-park-and-ride-lots-at-less-than-50-per-cent-capacity-as-public-servants-return-to-office/. See also Peter Karwacki, “#516 Park and Rides,” 13 Sept. 2026, https://peterkarwacki.blogspot.com/2026/09/park-and-rides.html.
  5. City of Ottawa, “Park and ride locations,” https://traffic.ottawa.ca/en/park_and_rides; OC Transpo, “Park & Ride,” https://www.octranspo.com/en/our-services/park-ride.
  6. Arthur White-Crummey, “OC Transpo missing fewer bus trips, but still missing targets,” CBC News, 11 Sept. 2026, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/oc-transpo-bus-reliability-ottawa-numbers-stats-9.7340666; Josh Pringle, “OC Transpo sees fewer riders on buses, O-Train for 7 straight months,” CTV News Ottawa, 9 Sept. 2026, https://www.ctvnews.ca/ottawa/article/oc-transpo-sees-fewer-riders-on-buses-o-train-for-7-straight-months/.
  7. OC Transpo, “Prices,” fares effective 1 July 2026, https://www.octranspo.com/en/fares/costs.
  8. White-Crummey, “OC Transpo missing fewer bus trips,” CBC News, 11 Sept. 2026; Josh Pringle, “This is why OC Transpo cancels hundreds of bus trips,” CTV News Ottawa, 10 Sept. 2026, https://www.ctvnews.ca/ottawa/article/this-is-why-oc-transpo-cancels-hundreds-of-bus-trips/.
  9. City of Ottawa, “Private Transportation Company Licensing,” https://ottawa.ca/en/business/permits-and-licences/business-licences/private-transportation-company-licensing; City of Ottawa, “Taxi, Limousine and Private Transportation Companies,” https://ottawa.ca/en/residents/transportation-and-parking/oc-transpo-and-public-transit/taxi-limousines-and-private-transportation-companies.
  10. City of Ottawa, Transit By-law No. 2007-268, especially the requirement that no person operate a passenger transportation system unless authorized, and the limited exceptions for school, rail, and certain private non-advertised employee services. https://ottawa.ca/en/living-ottawa/laws-licences-and-permits/laws/laws-z/transit-law-no-2007-268.
Subscription prices and running times are planning estimates, not an operating service. Occupancy and fare figures are from public reporting current to mid-September 2026.

Rideau-Rockcliffe Civic Notes · peterkarwacki.blogspot.com

Hire the operator. Listen to him. Fund the timetable.

Peter Karwacki — Ward 13, Rideau-Rockcliffe
14 September 2026

King recently, blew hard about directing OCTranspo. Wrong. Transit is again the mayoral race’s favourite costume too. Candidates have service guarantees, fare cuts, 90-day reviews, and $1 rides. Well meaning, most of them. Operational know-how? Almost none of it.

That is not a personality contest. It is the same gap this city has lived with for years: political copy written faster than buses can leave a garage.

What riders already know

OC Transpo missed trips spiked in the winter. Ridership in the first half of 2026 sat around 67 percent of pre-pandemic levels while the budget assumed something closer to 82 percent. Fare revenue is short. Staff are forecasting a $12.35 million deficit this year after a $52 million hole last year. A $47 million provincial placeholder for the LRT upload is still sitting in the budget, unsigned as cash.

The Auditor General already said the quiet part: schedules that do not match traffic, New Ways to Bus built on outdated data, and councillors blocking stop and route tweaks that operations staff wanted for reliability. I have written the bearing file until the words “spalling” and “cartridge assembly” feel like ward furniture. St-Laurent still has a documented soffit problem. The east extension still has no passenger opening date. Trial running is not a press conference.

Riders did not invent this. The record did.

Candidates offering solutions is not the same as running a system

A mayor or a councillor can set fares, the levy, and whether the upload happens. They can hire and fire the general manager. They should not be rewriting run times from a doorstep flyer.

Alex Lawson has said out loud that he has not run a transit system. Fair. Jeff Leiper has three terms and a “reimburse them if the bus fails” guarantee. Sutcliffe has the incumbent’s 10-point plan and a $95 monthly pass promise. Neil Saravanamuttoo wants dollar rides. Ali Shayvard at least works at OC Transpo. Experience on council is not the same as spare-ratio math, shop capacity, or what happens when one bad bearing takes a third of the rail fleet offline.

I am not a career politician. I measure programs. The question is not who can announce reliability. It is who will stop treating operations as a branding exercise.

Hire a guy like Leary — and then get out of his way

In March the city hired Rick Leary. That hire is the most serious transit decision this term has made.

He started as a train attendant at the MBTA in Boston. Union card. Then York Region Transit. Then seven years as TTC CEO — a system roughly six times OC Transpo. He is not a candidate. He is an operator.

His first moves are the unglamorous ones operators always make: add running time so the published schedule is not a fiction, run a summer maintenance campaign on the diesel fleet before winter, get two-car trains back on Line 1, treat on-time performance as the product. Missed trips came down from the winter peak. He has said he wants to be judged on whether the numbers keep moving. Good. Publish the numbers. Hold him to them.

Listening to him means three things council has historically refused:

  • Operational details stay operational. Run times, spare ratios, stop spacing, maintenance priority. Not ward vetoes on a stop because it looks bad on a lawn sign.
  • He gets the mechanics, parts, and spare buses he says the timetable needs.
  • He is scored on delivered trips and on-time performance, not on whoever’s latest fare-cut video.

The Auditor General already documented councillor interference in route design. That is how you keep a professional GM and still run an amateur system.

Fund the service you pretend to sell

Reliability is a budget line. If there are not enough working buses, operators, and shop hours, advertised trips vanish. Cancellations push riders off. Lost riders shrink fare revenue. The next budget starts weaker. That is the death spiral, not a mystery.

Leary’s “realistic schedules” cost operator hours. A healthy spare ratio means vehicles sitting ready instead of every bus being flogged until it fails. New e-buses only help if they are actually in service. None of that is free.

Fare cuts without a replacement dollar — higher levy, confirmed upload money, or both — make the hole larger. The upload, if it actually lands, is the only large new source on the table. Sutcliffe has put the long-term figure near $85 million a year that could go back into buses. Until the cheque clears, “required funding” is still a municipal choice: tax, reserves, or cuts.

Do not cut fares as a substitute for spare buses. Do not announce frequency you cannot staff. Do not budget ridership you have not earned back.

What I would do from Ward 13

I do not run OC Transpo. Neither does any other councillor. What a councillor can do is refuse to be the person who blocks a reliability tweak, refuse to wave through a schedule that the auditor already called fiction, and insist the trial-running criteria for the east extension are public before the test starts — not after, the way 2019 was handled.

I have said this on the east extension before. Hold the line on testing. Publish pass/fail in advance. Do not lower the bar mid-trial because an opening date is politically convenient.

Same standard for buses. If staff say a stop consolidation or added run time improves reliability for half the ridership, the local councillor’s job is not to veto it for applause. The job is to explain the tradeoff and measure the result.

Outputs versus outcomes. Announced service versus delivered trips. That is the whole file.

The short version

Well-meaning candidates will keep offering solutions. Ottawa already hired the operator. Listen to him. Fund the timetable at the level the timetable requires. Score the system on whether the bus showed up, not whether the press release did.

On October 26, inform yourselves. Vote on the record.

Vote Peter Karwacki for Rideau-Rockcliffe.
peterkarwacki.blogspot.com


Related on this blog:
#256 Choo-choo but no DO-DO — east extension, no opening date, not enough cars.
#420 A splakin' and a spawlin' — the bearing file.
#422 Hold the Line on LRT testing — do not lower the bar mid-trial.
Ottawa Transit Committee? — committees, elections, and what we have to show for them.

Sunday, 13 September 2026

#516 Park and Rides - expect the "unexpected"

 


A damning series of statistics.


High occupancy (rail-connected lots)
  • Bowesville (Line 2): 93%
  • Place d’Orléans (Line 1): 85%
  • Leitrim (Line 2): 78%
  • Greenboro (Line 2): 63%
  • Trim: 59%
Low occupancy (mostly bus-oriented suburban lots)
  • Eagleson (Kanata): 38% of 1,220 spaces
  • Fallowfield (Barrhaven, the city’s largest lot): 30% of 1,709 spaces
  • Strandherd: 20%
  • Innovation: 13%
  • Terry Fox: 11% of ~517 spaces
  • Nepean Woods: 5%
Surprise?

People are voting with their feet and their cars

Commuters are choosing the option that feels most reliable and time-certain, which right now is often driving the whole way rather than using many of the large bus-oriented lots. These are early-September averages; peak-hour occupancy at the popular rail lots is even higher (Bowesville often fills by 8:30 a.m.).

Ottawa has a well-documented record of engineering and project problems on major transit work, and that record is a fair reason to be skeptical of official reassurances. Things could get out of hand when they start scaling the concrete in the St. LAURENT tunnel.

Water leakage in that 1980s tunnel has been known for decades. Inspections in 2020 already flagged severe delamination and called some repairs “urgent.” The full 2022 inspection was deferred. Pieces of concrete later fell onto the tracks. Officials still described the issues as “manageable” and “not a safety concern” while installing temporary mesh. That history of delayed action and optimistic language is why people do not automatically trust the current set of engineering statements.

What they have so far is mostly surface information:
  • Visual checks of leaks, stains, cracks, and loose tiles
  • Sounding (tapping the concrete with hammers or bars). A hollow or dull sound usually means the outer layer has separated from the slab underneath. Then they scale (chip) off the loose pieces
  • Periodic OSIM inspections, which are detailed visual-plus-sounding reviews. The 2022 round was largely skipped on three of the four tunnel sections because of construction on the bus terminal above
  • A delamination survey Stantec did in 2025
  • Some opening of ceiling tiles after the 2024 incidents
The problem with being a doom sayer is that nobody thanks you if you are right and nobody thanks you if you are wrong.

My advice? Protect yourself. Plan for it. Expect the unexpected.

RegionPark & Ride LotAverage Occupancy (%)Total Spot Capacity
O-Train Line 2 / SouthBowesville93%~823
East / OrléansPlace d'Orléans85%N/A
O-Train Line 2 / SouthLeitrim78%~308
O-Train Line 2 / SouthGreenboro63%~575
East / OrléansTrim59%N/A
West / KanataEagleson38%~1,220
South / BarrhavenFallowfield30%~1,709
South / BarrhavenStrandherd20%~330
West / KanataInnovation13%~246
West / KanataTerry Fox11%N/A
South / BarrhavenNepean Woods5%~278
Primary Source: City of Ottawa Mobility Dashboard (Engage Ottawa), updated weekly to present transit performance and Park & Ride availability metrics. Secondary Source: Local Ottawa reporting via CTV News Ottawa covering the City's Fall Mobility Update. 

 Gemini Advises the following: The stark contrast in Park & Ride occupancy reveals critical shifts in commuting behavior, infrastructure efficacy, and city design across Ottawa: 

 **1. The "Rail Effect" Driving High Utilization** * 
**Higher Transit Reliability:** Lots connected to rapid transit lines—such as Bowesville (93%), Leitrim (78%), and Greenboro (63%) on Line 2, along with Place d'Orléans (85%)—see heavily concentrated usage. * 
**Seamless Commuting:** Commuters are significantly more willing to park and ride when transitioning onto high-frequency rail or dedicated rapidways rather than relying on traditional mixed-traffic feeder buses. 

 **2. The Decline of Suburban Bus Express Commuting** * 
**Kanata & Barrhaven Lag:** 
West-end (Eagleson at 38%, Terry Fox at 11%) and South-end (Fallowfield at 30%, Nepean Woods at 5%) lots are drastically underutilized. 

* **Remote & Hybrid Work:
** Suburban regions with high concentrations of tech workers and federal public servants continue to leverage flexible hybrid schedules, shrinking daily long-distance transit demand. *

 **Direct Driving vs. Bus Transfers:** 
With Highway 417 and arterial roads accessible, suburban commuters increasingly prefer driving directly to their destinations rather than parking to board buses that may face traffic congestion or route transfers. 

 **3. Infrastructure and Budgetary Implications** * 

**Underutilized Real Estate:** 
Large lots like Fallowfield (~1,700 spots) and Eagleson (~1,200 spots) represent vast tracts of paved asphalt operating at a fraction of capacity. 

* **Repurposing Opportunities:** 
These low-occupancy sites highlight potential opportunities for transit-oriented development (TOD), affordable housing, or municipal infill projects rather than single-use parking spaces. * 

**Service Allocation:** Low lot usage challenges the cost-effectiveness of running heavy express feeder routes to underperforming lots, pushing OC Transpo toward reallocating bus hours to high-demand corridors and local neighborhood connectors.