Campaign Video

Https://youtu.be/zBxbnuPAazE

Sunday, 16 August 2026

#429 Layin' Pipe

Why Kilmory and Bowmoor Keep Flooding: Ottawa’s Aging Pipes vs. Modern Standards

Why Kilmory and Bowmoor Keep Flooding:
Ottawa’s Aging Pipes vs. Modern Standards

Parkwood Hills, Ward 9 (Knoxdale-Merivale) · August 2026

Residents on Kilmory Crescent and the neighbouring street Bowmoor Avenue in Ottawa’s Parkwood Hills neighbourhood have lived through the same frustrating cycle for years: heavy rain arrives, basements flood, streets turn into temporary rivers, and the cleanup begins again. The July 1, 2026 Canada Day storm was the most dramatic recent example, but it was not the first. Similar problems appeared in August 2023 and during earlier intense rainfall events.

The root cause is not mysterious. These two streets share a mid-20th-century stormwater and sanitary system that was never designed to the standards the City of Ottawa applies today.

What “Modern Standard” Actually Means

Since at least the early 2010s (formalized in the City of Ottawa Sewer Design Guidelines, October 2012 edition and later updates), Ottawa has required the dual-drainage principle for new development and major upgrades:

  • Minor system (underground pipes and catch basins): sized to carry the 2-year to 5-year storm under free-flow conditions without surcharging.
  • Major system (streets, ditches, parks and planned overland routes): sized to safely convey the 100-year storm, with strict limits on ponding depth and freeboard to building openings.

In practice, the minor system is most often designed for the 5-year event. Excess water from rarer storms is expected to travel on the surface without entering basements.

Key performance targets under current guidelines:
• Building openings must sit at least 0.30 m above the 100-year water surface elevation.
• Surface flow depth is generally limited to less than 0.35 m.
• Post-development peak flows are typically restricted to the 2-year or 5-year pre-development rate (runoff coefficient C ≤ 0.5).

How 1960s Design Differs

Parkwood Hills was largely built in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, engineers commonly sized storm sewers for a 2-year return period (or an equivalent lower standard). There was little formal requirement for a continuous, engineered major system that could handle a 100-year event. Once the pipes filled, water had nowhere planned to go except onto streets, into yards, and often into basements through foundation drains or sewer laterals.

That is why Kilmory and Bowmoor experience nearly identical flooding: they sit in the same legacy drainage catchment.

Comparative Chart: Design Criteria and Pipe Capacity Implications

Exact pipe diameters on these streets vary by catchment area and slope, but the design return period drives capacity. The table below shows the practical difference.

Design Aspect 1960s-Era System
(Parkwood Hills / Kilmory–Bowmoor)
Current Ottawa Dual-Drainage Standard
Minor-system design storm Typically 2-year return period 5-year return period (free-flow)
Major-system design storm Limited or informal overland flow 100-year return period (planned routes)
Target level of service Protection against frequent, smaller storms No basement flooding or excessive street flooding up to 100-year event
Typical intensity ratio
(short-duration storms, Ottawa IDF)
Baseline (2-year) ~1.3–1.5× higher intensity for 5-year;
~2.0–2.5× higher for 100-year
Pipe capacity implication
(Manning’s equation, same slope & roughness)
Smaller diameter sufficient for design flow Larger diameter required; capacity scales roughly with diameter8/3. A 30–50 % increase in design flow often needs a noticeably larger pipe.
Inlet control / surcharge control Rarely used Commonly required so pipes do not surcharge during the minor-system design storm
Freeboard to buildings Not systematically required Minimum 0.30 m above 100-year water level
Climate-change allowance None Often +20 % intensity applied in modern designs

Note: Actual pipe diameters on Kilmory and Bowmoor are not published in a single public inventory for every segment. The comparison above reflects the governing design criteria rather than a specific measured pipe. Capacity differences compound across an entire neighbourhood network.

What This Means for Residents

When a storm exceeds roughly the 2- to 5-year intensity—events that climate data show are becoming more common—the old pipes fill, the hydraulic grade line rises, and water seeks the path of least resistance. That path frequently leads into basements. The 2026 Canada Day storm (locally exceeding 140–160 mm in parts of the west end) simply made the deficiency obvious at city-wide scale.

Partial upgrades have occurred in some nearby streets over the years (sewer replacements and inlet controls after earlier floods), but the overall network serving Kilmory and Bowmoor has not been brought up to full dual-drainage standards.

Practical Next Steps

  • Report every flooding incident to 3-1-1 so the City’s data accurately reflects the problem.
  • Consider private protective measures (backwater valves, sump pumps with battery backup). The City’s Residential Protective Plumbing Program offers rebates for eligible homes built before certain dates.
  • Advocate, through the Ward 9 councillor’s office, for a targeted drainage study and capital upgrade of this catchment.
  • Support broader city initiatives that combine bigger pipes where needed with low-impact development (rain gardens, permeable surfaces, downspout disconnection) to reduce the volume reaching the sewers in the first place.

The infrastructure under Kilmory Crescent and Bowmoor Avenue was built to the standards of its time. Those standards are no longer adequate for the rainfall intensities Ottawa now experiences. Until the system is brought closer to today’s dual-drainage criteria, repeated flooding will remain a predictable outcome rather than a surprise.

Based on City of Ottawa Sewer Design Guidelines (2012 and updates), public flood investigation reports, and documented performance of Parkwood Hills during the 2023 and 2026 extreme rainfall events. Pipe-sizing relationships follow standard hydraulic principles (Manning’s equation). Individual property conditions vary; professional assessment is recommended for specific homes.

#428 Dividend? Infrastructure not LRT

Ottawa Finds $22 Million a Year. It Should Say So, In Writing.

Ward 13 · Infrastructure Accountability

Ottawa Finds $22 Million a Year. It Should Say So, In Writing.

Hydro Ottawa hands the City a dividend every June. It lands in general revenue, gets used for whatever council needs that year, and nothing on paper stops it from quietly absorbing LRT-related debt service. It should be earmarked, in a council-approved policy, for core infrastructure renewal — and explicitly walled off from the P3/LRT liability line.

$22.1M
2026 Hydro dividend
$0
Earmarked for core infrastructure
$1.23B
City's own stated funding gap

Every June, Hydro Ottawa's board walks into council chambers, presents its annual report, and hands the City a cheque. It's treated as good news — and on its own terms, it is. But look at what happens to that money after the handshake, and the story changes from "the utility is healthy" to "the City has a discretionary slush fund with no name on it."


01 — The mechanismWhat the dividend policy actually says

Hydro Ottawa Holding Inc. is a private company, 100% owned by the City of Ottawa, created when the province forced municipal electricity utilities to incorporate under the Electricity Act, 1998. As sole shareholder, council sets the dividend policy. Since 2006, that policy has directed Hydro Ottawa to pay the City 60% of net income or $14 million, whichever is greater — and in 2016, council locked in a guaranteed floor of $20 million a year starting in 2017, specifically so budget staff could plan around a predictable number rather than a number that moves with storm damage and commodity prices.

It has worked, in the narrow sense that it delivers cash reliably. Cumulative dividends passed roughly $369 million by the end of 2023. The 2025 payment was $22.3 million; the 2026 payment, presented at the June 2026 Annual General Meeting, is $22.1 million.

The dividend has been a reliable annual transfer for two decades

hydro ottawa → city of ottawa, selected years, $ millions

$0 $10M $20M $30M 2015 $19.4M 2017 $20M floor 2022 $20M 2023 $20M 2025 $22.3M 2026 $22.1M

Sources: CBC News (2016); Hydro Ottawa 2022 & 2023 AGM reports to Council; Hydro Ottawa Group June 2026 AGM release.

The direction of travel is up, not down — and that's the point of this piece. It's not a rounding error. It's a growing, dependable stream, and right now it has no destination written into policy beyond "general revenue."


02 — The gapWhere that stream disappears into

Hydro Ottawa's own language on this is consistent, year after year: the dividend "will be used by the City to fund municipal programs and services." That's it. That's the entire earmark. It is, by design, fungible — the same undifferentiated pool that funds the police budget, transit operations, road resurfacing, and debt service on every capital project council has ever approved, including the ones I've already documented running over budget or piling up as off-balance-sheet risk.

Hydro dividend — $22.1M/yr General Revenue Fund (undifferentiated)
could offset any budget line, including P3/LRT debt service
could offset any budget line, including transit operating shortfalls

Meanwhile, the City's own Long Range Financial Plan work has already put a number on the problem this money could be solving. Council's June 2026 infrastructure and transit motion explicitly names a $1.23 billion funding gap for maintaining and renewing City infrastructure — a separate, narrower figure from the $10.6–10.8 billion ten-year infrastructure gap I've written about previously, but pointing at the same underlying problem: the basics (roads, facilities, water and sewer renewal) are underfunded, on the record, by the City's own staff.

One year's dividend, next to the gap it could be chipping away at

log scale — the bars are not proportional to pixel height below $100M; see labelled values

Annual dividend $22.1M City's stated gap $1.23B (2026 LRFP) 10-year gap $10.8B

Sources: City of Ottawa, "Council approves City joining federal clean-fuel program" (June 2026 council motion coverage); Peter Karwacki, "Ottawa Doesn't Have $419 Million Lying Around..." liabilities series (10-year gap).

Let's be honest about scale: even fully earmarked, $22 million doesn't close a billion-dollar gap. That's not the argument. The argument is that a growing, guaranteed, publicly-owned revenue stream is currently doing the least accountable thing money can do at City Hall — disappearing into "general revenue" — when it could be doing the most accountable thing: showing up, every year, as a named line against a named backlog.


03 — The exception that proves the ruleCouncil already knows how to do this — for climate, not for infrastructure broadly

Here's what makes the current setup frustrating rather than just imperfect: council has already built the mechanism once. In the same June 2026 motion that named the $1.23 billion gap, council directed staff to create a new reserve fund for climate-related infrastructure capital projects, funded in part by "a portion of revenues from the annual Hydro Ottawa dividend."

What this proves

Council does not need new legal authority, a provincial ask, or a charter change to earmark dividend revenue. It already voted to do exactly that — for one category of spending. The precedent exists. It's just scoped narrowly to climate projects, and it's "a portion of," not all of, the dividend.

That's a good start on a program that should be the default, not a one-off carve-out attached to a single climate motion. If a portion of the dividend can be walled off for climate infrastructure by council motion, the rest of it can be walled off for core infrastructure renewal — roads, water and sewer mains, facilities — the same way, by the same mechanism, this term.


04 — Why "not LRT" has to be explicitThe P3/LRT liability is exactly the kind of hole this money would otherwise fall into

This is the part that needs to be written into the policy in plain language, not left to budget-season discretion. I've already documented that the City's off-balance-sheet P3/LRT liability line was the fastest-growing item in the consolidated financial statements — up $135.8 million in a single year, the smallest line item but the fastest mover. I've documented the East Extension's repeated timeline slippage. I've documented the St-Laurent tunnel's still-unrepaired structural risk. None of that is a reason to send utility dividend revenue chasing after it.

General revenue is fungible by definition. Without an explicit exclusion, a dollar of Hydro dividend that nominally goes toward "infrastructure" can simply free up a dollar of tax levy that then flows to LRT debt service, transit operating shortfalls, or Lansdowne 2.0's $16.4–17.4 million a year in debt servicing — and nobody outside the budget office would ever be able to tell the difference. An earmark that doesn't name what it excludes isn't really an earmark.

What "earmarked, not LRT" should mean in the policy text

A dedicated Infrastructure Renewal Reserve, funded by the full annual Hydro Ottawa dividend, with an explicit clause excluding its use for P3/LRT debt service, Lansdowne 2.0 debt service, or any transit capital cost overrun — reported publicly, dollar-for-dollar, against the $1.23 billion gap each budget cycle.


05 — The askFour things council can do without asking anyone's permission

  1. Convert the dividend policy from a revenue target into a renewal fund. Amend the shareholder declaration so the full annual dividend flows to a named Infrastructure Renewal Reserve, not general revenue, by default.
  2. Write the LRT exclusion into the policy text. Explicitly bar the reserve from being drawn on for P3/LRT debt service, Lansdowne 2.0 debt service, or transit capital overruns — the same discipline already applied, informally, to the climate carve-out.
  3. Extend the June 2026 precedent citywide. The climate infrastructure reserve fund already proves council can do this. Use the identical mechanism for the core renewal backlog instead of inventing a new process.
  4. Report it against the $1.23 billion gap, every budget cycle. One page, public, showing what the reserve took in, what it spent, and how much of the stated gap it closed that year — the same transparency standard I've asked for on the liabilities file generally.

None of this requires the OEB, the province, or a new tax. It requires council deciding that a City-owned company's profits should be visibly rebuilding the City that owns it — not quietly patching whatever budget line is short that December.


  • City to get guaranteed $20M a year from Hydro Ottawa after policy change approved
    CBC News · Kate Porter · June 22, 2016
  • Why does Hydro Ottawa pay the City of Ottawa a dividend?
    Hydro Ottawa · corporate FAQ
  • Hydro Ottawa presents 2022 Annual Report to City Council
    Hydro Ottawa Group newsroom · Oct. 25, 2023
  • Hydro Ottawa presents 2023 Annual Report to City Council
    Hydro Ottawa Group / CNW · June 25, 2024
  • Past progress, future powered: Hydro Ottawa highlights record 2025 investments and launches 2026-2030 Strategic Direction
    Hydro Ottawa Group / CNW · June 24, 2026
  • Powering the Capital: Hydro Ottawa Group Reports on Big Investments and Bigger Demand
    Ottawa Life Magazine · June 27, 2025
  • Council approves City joining federal clean-fuel program
    City of Ottawa newsroom · June 2026 — source of the $1.23B gap figure and the climate infrastructure reserve motion
  • Ottawa approves $1.2-billion infrastructure funding plan, transit investments and housing measures
    Ontario Construction News · July 2, 2026
Peter Karwacki is a candidate for Ward 13 (Rideau-Rockcliffe) in Ottawa's October 2026 municipal election. PMP-certified, trained data analyst, 13 years at IBM and Cognos.

#427 For the "How" - I' m your man

Knowing the What Isn't the Job
Ward 13 — Rideau-Rockcliffe Candidate — Peter Karwacki Election — October 2026
Project Charter · Draft for Public Comment

Knowing the What Isn't the Job.

I can tell you what needs to change in this city. So can a lot of people. The job is getting a hundred different departments, contractors, and residents to actually move — and that's a different skill entirely.

Sponsor
Residents of Rideau-Rockcliffe
Method
ADKAR change management
Candidate background
PMP · Data Analyst · 13 yrs, IBM/Cognos
Status
In progress — see case log below

Opening argument

Every council in Ottawa's history has known what needed to happen. Fewer of them have known how to make it happen — through staff who don't report to them, contractors who don't answer to voters, and departments that operate on their own clocks. That gap has a name in project management. It's the whole reason a framework like ADKAR exists.

I'm a certified Project Management Professional. I trained as a data analyst. I spent thirteen years at IBM and Cognos learning, in practice, that a good plan and a delivered plan are two entirely different projects. Ottawa's council chamber is full of good plans. This city's actual record — on transit, on infrastructure, on oversight — is a record of the second project going sideways.

This post does three things: explains the framework I use to think about this, shows exactly where it's breaking down in Ward 13 right now, and lays out what running the "how" would actually look like.

Part One — The Framework

ADKAR isn't a slogan. It's a sequence, and every step is a place to fail.

ADKAR breaks organizational change into five stages a person — or a city — has to pass through, in order, before a change actually sticks. Skip a stage and the change doesn't happen; it just gets announced.

ADKAR staircase: Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability, Reinforcement, with most municipal announcements stalling after Desire. STEP 1 Awareness STEP 2 Desire MOST NEWSLETTERS STOP HERE ↑ STEP 3 Knowledge (the how) STEP 4 Ability (the doing) STEP 5 Reinforcement (it holds) Transit oversight Tunnel repair Police audits

ADKAR's five stages, staged ascending — and where three live Ward 13 files actually stall.

Awareness and Desire are the easy stages, politically. They're a press release and a vote. Knowledge, Ability, and Reinforcement are the hard ones — they require someone to sit in the room with the people actually doing the work, build the capacity to do it, and check back later to make sure it didn't quietly slide backward. That's not a communications job. It's a delivery job. It's the job I've done for a living.

Part Two — The Case Log

Where Ward 13's own files stall — and who's supposed to be pushing them

These aren't hypotheticals. They're three open files in this ward, each one stuck at a different late-stage ADKAR gate, each one sitting on a desk that reports, one way or another, to your councillor.

03Stalls at Knowledge

Transit oversight without a seat at the table

Councillor King has made repeated public calls for stronger LRT oversight. But across his full tenure, he has never sat on the Transit Commission or the Light Rail Subcommittee — the two bodies where the operational knowledge that makes oversight real actually lives.

You can't build the "how" of fixing a rail system from outside the room where the rail system's problems get explained. Awareness and Desire, repeated in a newsletter. Knowledge, never acquired.

04Stalls at Ability

A tunnel with a five-year-old warning, still not fixed

The St-Laurent LRT station tunnel had "urgent" structural inspection findings flagged in 2020. The follow-up inspection in 2022 was skipped. As of this writing, repair is still years out, even as the risk has been described in the City's own tendering documents as ongoing and serious — and the pre-tender estimate is a floor, not a ceiling.

The station sits in Ward 13. Councillor King has made no public statement on it. Knowing a tunnel needs fixing is Awareness. Funding, staffing, and scheduling the fix is Ability — and that's the stage where this file has sat, unmoved, for years.

Pre-tender estimate: ~$9.5M · Warning age: 5+ years

05Stalls at Reinforcement

"Not robust," and nothing built to fix it

Ottawa's Auditor General has flagged the Ottawa Police Service's database-misuse auditing as inadequate — the Chief's own word for it was "not robust." That's a known problem with a known, off-the-shelf technical fix: anomaly detection on access logs is not exotic technology in 2026.

Councillor King sat on the Police Services Board and resigned from it in 2022, vouching for the board's competence on the way out. The safe workplace program's budget has since been cut from $8.2M to $5.4M. A known gap, publicly acknowledged, with no reinforcement mechanism built to close it and keep it closed.

Safe workplace budget: $8.2M (2022) → $5.4M (current)

Three files. Three different late-stage failures. One common thread: nobody stayed in the room long enough to do the unglamorous part.

Part Three — Running the How

What "getting things done through others" actually looks like on council

This isn't a promise to work harder. It's a specific method, applied to specific files, with the same discipline I'd apply to any delivery project — because that's what a council term is.

A —
Awareness

Make the liabilities visible, on one page, every quarter

A consolidated liability statement — on- and off-balance-sheet, OMERS, the infrastructure gap, Hydro Ottawa's own debt — published on a fixed cycle instead of assembled by residents from scattered financial statements.

D —
Desire

Tie a funding source to every debt motion, no exceptions

Council votes for things constantly. A standing rule that no debt motion passes without a named funding source attached forces the "want to do this" stage to actually confront the "how we pay for it" stage, on the record, before the vote.

K —
Knowledge

Sit on the committees where the operational knowledge lives

Transit Commission. Light Rail Subcommittee. The bodies where you actually learn how the system works before you claim to oversee it. Not optional, not a newsletter substitute.

A —
Ability

Fix the 311 pipeline so tickets connect to projects

Modify 311 itself — GPS-aware project lookup, ticket-to-project linking at creation — instead of building a parallel app. Reuse the budget and the users the City already has. That's how 123,000 orphaned tickets stop becoming a bulk-closure story.

R —
Reinforcement

A standing accountability motion, every budget cycle, plus a sunset clause

A quarterly infrastructure-gap tracker. A recurring liability accountability motion. A four-year sunset review on major liability decisions. Reinforcement is what stops a fix from quietly reverting once the press release cycle moves on.

Closing argument

A council seat is, functionally, an executive delivery role: you don't do the work yourself, you get a hundred people who don't report to you to do it, on schedule, and you keep checking that it stuck. That's the job I've done for thirteen years, under a name — change management — that most councils have never once applied to themselves.

Knowing the what has never been Ottawa's problem. This ward has a five-year-old tunnel warning, a transit file nobody with a vote has ever really studied, and a police audit gap everyone agrees is "not robust" and nobody has funded a fix for, to prove it.

The nomination deadline is August 21.

If this is the kind of oversight you want in Ward 13, the fastest way to help is to make sure you're registered to vote in October — and to keep asking your councillor which ADKAR stage any given promise is actually at.

Read more at the campaign blog

Peter Karwacki · Candidate, Ward 13 (Rideau-Rockcliffe) · Ottawa Municipal Election, October 2026

i


Saturday, 15 August 2026

#426 2001: A Placement Oddity


Look, there's  shitter in the middle of the road!


Am I the only candidate asking for a city wide policy on public washrooms? 

Now, 2026: An outplacement oddity

Praised, Then Gone: What the BMDA's Leadership Churn Says About Its Governance

The ByWard Market District Authority has now gone through two executive directors in under a year. One stepped down. One was fired without explanation, seven months after the board publicly praised her fit for the job. Neither departure came with real accountability to the people the Market actually serves.

The pattern

Zachary Dayler, the BMDA's founding executive director, stepped down in September 2025 after roughly five years leading the organization (first as ByWard Market BIA, then through the 2023 merger into the BMDA). The board launched a national search through Odgers Canada. Victoria Williston — the BMDA's own communications and marketing manager at the time — put her name forward and got the job in January 2026.

The board's announcement left no ambiguity about how it felt:

"Victoria brings a strong understanding of the ByWard Market and the broader civic environment in which it operates. She has demonstrated an ability to balance strategic thinking with sound governance and a clear commitment to public service. The Board is confident that her leadership aligns well with the organization's priorities."
— Sandy Smallwood, BMDA board chair, January 2026

Seven months later, Williston was terminated. Board spokesperson Suzanne Valiquet called it "an internal and private matter" and said the board would not comment further. No cause was given, publicly or otherwise.

Williston did not treat it as a firing in her own account. Her LinkedIn post the following Saturday read like a departure announcement, not a termination notice — crediting her team, listing the Carré ByWard Square opening and the Night Ambassador Program relaunch as wins, and closing with plans to take the rest of the summer off before sharing "what comes next" in the fall.

Two different exits, one shared problem

It's worth being precise here: Dayler's departure and Williston's are not the same kind of event. Dayler stepped down. Williston was let go by board decision. Collapsing the two into "back-to-back firings" would overstate what's actually on the record.

But the precision cuts the other way too. What the two departures do share is this: an organization now on its second unplanned leadership transition in under a year, governed by a board that answers to no one on council and explains itself to no one when it moves. Whether an executive director leaves voluntarily or is pushed out, the residents and businesses who live with the BMDA's decisions get the same thing either time — a closed door and a press release.

The board that praised her is the board that won't explain itself

The dissonance is the story. In January, the board chair went out of his way to vouch for Williston's judgment, her grasp of "the broader civic environment," her "commitment to public service." In August, the same board terminated her and declined to say why — not to the public, and, by Councillor Stéphanie Plante's account, not even to the ward's own elected representative before it happened.

"I actually didn't know until yesterday, so it's not a decision that I made. It wasn't one that would have been made in consultation with me because I'm not on the board."
— Coun. Stéphanie Plante (Rideau-Vanier), whose ward includes the Market

That's not a knock on Plante. It's a description of how the BMDA is built: a municipal services corporation whose board can hire, praise, and fire its top executive with no binding obligation to tell the one council member whose constituents actually live with the results.

Structural, not personal

Barry Padolsky, the architect and longtime ByWard Market preservation advocate, read the firing the same way — as a symptom, not an isolated personnel decision:

"It seems that the dismissal of the appointment of the executive director seems to be a way of admitting that there is a problem… the ByWard Market District Authority isn't structurally set up to be able to be more widely consultative about its mandate."

That tracks with what businesses and residents in the Market have been saying for months: a Business Advisory Committee that's shrunk from seven members to three, decisions made without meaningful notice, and a governance model that formally excludes merchants and property owners from voting seats. Williston spent part of the summer publicly defending that structure. She's no longer there to defend it, and the structure hasn't changed.

What this actually asks of Ward 13's next council seat

The BMDA isn't going away, and its 200th-anniversary year for the Market is coming up in 2027 whether its leadership is stable or not. Two EDs in a year, a board that won't explain a termination, and a ward councillor's seat with no vote is not a governance model that self-corrects. It's one that needs a council seat willing to ask, in public, the questions the board isn't volunteering answers to:

  • What was the actual reason for Williston's termination — performance, direction, or a board-level disagreement she was caught in the middle of?
  • Why does the ward councillor's BMDA seat carry no vote, and should that change before the next leadership transition?
  • Is the Business Advisory Committee's shrinkage from seven members to three being addressed, or is it being treated as a footnote?
  • What does the board's search process for a third executive director in under two years look like, and will it include real consultation with vendors and residents this time?

An organization that praises its own hire in January and fires her without explanation in August isn't demonstrating strategic thinking. It's demonstrating exactly the consultation gap its critics have been pointing at all year — just with a new name attached to it.

#425 Inform yourselves! Then Vote Differently and Wisely

 For the "How" I'm your man


The portion of the 2022 debate. Rogers removed it from its catalogue for some reason.



Inform yourselves. Vote differentl and wisely. Vote for Peter Karwacki for Rideau Rockcliffe.



#424 Out and about by bike

 

The good bike intersection


By comparison

Coventry and St. Laurent

What a mess.



#423 We Need Parking and we need Housing

 

Council is being asked to approve a fixed zoning envelope today based on a transit network that may exist tomorrow, with the actual parking and transportation management plan deferred to a later stage that isn't binding.

Ottawa Is Asking Council to Approve 1,505 Homes on a Station That Doesn't Exist Yet

A staff report going to Planning and Housing Committee this week shows how far a zoning approval can get on an assumption nobody has funded, designed, or committed to build.

On August 19, Planning and Housing Committee will consider a Zoning By-law Amendment (File ACS2026-PDB-PSX-0040) for 530 Brisebois Crescent and part of 265 Centrum Boulevard in Orléans Town Centre. The ask: four high-rise towers between 30 and 40 storeys, plus a nine-storey mid-rise, for a combined 1,505 residential units. Staff recommend approval. Council votes August 26.

This isn't a Ward 13 file. But it's worth reading closely, because it's a clean example of a pattern that shows up across this city's biggest approvals: a plan gets sold on the strength of infrastructure that is planned, hoped for, or simply assumed — not infrastructure that is funded, designed, or under construction. The gap between those two things is where residents end up absorbing the risk.

The Number That Does All the Work

The application proposes zero resident vehicle parking. Not reduced parking — none. Just 136 visitor spaces and 753 bicycle spaces for 1,505 units.

That's legally allowed. Provincial changes to the Planning Act (Bill 185, 2024) bar municipalities from requiring vehicle parking inside a Protected Major Transit Station Area, and these lands qualify. Staff can't impose a minimum even if they wanted to.

But "the City can't require it" and "the plan works without it" are two different claims, and the report leans on the second one without earning it.

The applicant's own Transportation Impact Assessment reports observed driver mode share of 54% (AM peak) and 61% (PM peak) for existing Orléans high-rise residential buildings — that is, the real, measured behaviour of people already living in towers in this part of the city. The applicant then discounts that down to a projected 40% driver share for this development, and the entire reduction rides on one thing: a future Orléans Town Centre LRT station, positioned as the development's walking-distance rapid transit connection.

That station does not have a design. It does not have committed funding. It does not have a construction timeline. The TIA itself describes it only as part of the City's "Needs-Based Transit Network" — a planning category, not a project.

Strip the assumed station out, and the applicant's own study says the real number is 55% driver share, producing an estimated 180 to 200 additional peak-hour vehicle trips. Even with the future station baked in, the TIA still projects that roughly half of all resident trips will involve a private vehicle. Without it, that climbs to roughly 65%.

Read that again: the study supporting a zero-parking design still expects half its residents to be driving, under the best-case assumption. The zoning isn't betting that people won't own cars. It's betting that somewhere else will absorb where those cars go.

"Somewhere Else" Has a Name

Eliminating a parking requirement doesn't eliminate parking demand. It relocates it. In this case: the 136 visitor spaces, nearby commercial lots, surrounding public streets, and a roughly 30-space community centre lot that's supposed to serve the whole neighbourhood — all become the default overflow for a 1,505-unit development's residents.

A community centre parking lot that's been colonized by residential overflow parking doesn't function as a community centre lot anymore. Neither do a business's customer spaces. This isn't a hypothetical; it's the predictable mechanical result of putting the car somewhere when zoning says it can't be under the building.

The Unit Mix Cuts the Other Way

Of the 1,505 proposed units, 647 are two-bedroom and 159 are three-bedroom, plus ground-floor townhouses. That's a family-weighted mix, not a downtown-studio mix. Families are statistically more likely to need vehicle access — for childcare, groceries, medical appointments, caregiving, work that isn't reachable by a 15-minute LRT walkshed. A zero-parking design makes more sense for a building full of young singles near a subway platform than it does for a development explicitly designed, per the City's own large-household intensification targets, to house families.

Site Plan Control Is Being Asked to Fix What Zoning Should Decide

The staff report states plainly that "the final parking supply and Transportation Demand Management program will be addressed through future Site Plan Control applications." Meanwhile, Council is being asked to approve the entire building envelope — heights, massing, unit count, zero-parking framework — right now, at the zoning stage.

That's a sequencing problem. Zoning approval is largely irreversible. You cannot easily retrofit parking structure into a 40-storey tower once it's built. The mechanism that's supposed to manage the development's single biggest operational risk hasn't been designed yet, and Council is being asked to lock in the envelope before it exists.

The Design Panel's Objection Got a Non-Answer

The Urban Design Review Panel recommended cutting the nine-storey Centrum Boulevard building down to six storeys, to better match street scale and ease the transition to the 30-storey corner tower. The applicant declined, and the stated reason was that nine storeys "aligns with what is permitted in the Secondary Plan."

That's true, but it isn't a rebuttal. "It's allowed" answers a legal question. It doesn't answer the design question the panel actually raised, which was about street-level scale, not the ceiling set by policy.

What the Ward Councillor Actually Said

To be clear about what's not being disputed here: Councillor Luloff's own comment in the report supports the density, the height, and the Hub/transit-oriented-development policy direction for this site. His objection is narrower and, frankly, harder to argue with — that Council is being asked to approve a fixed zoning envelope today based on a transit network that may exist tomorrow, with the actual parking and transportation management plan deferred to a later stage that isn't binding.

His office reports receiving more than 1,000 comments on this file. Planning decisions shouldn't be a show of hands. But when the volume of concern and the substance of the concern point at the same specific number — the assumed 40% driver share resting on an unfunded station — that's worth Council's attention before a vote, not after.

The Ask

Nobody needs to relitigate whether this site should hold density, or whether Orléans Town Centre should build up near transit. The Secondary Plan already answered that, and the answer is yes. The question on the table August 26 is narrower: should Council lock in a zero-parking envelope on the strength of a station that has no design, no funding, and no timeline — while leaving the actual parking and transportation management plan to a future stage that hasn't been written yet?

A more defensible path exists: approve the density and height as proposed, and require the Transportation Demand Management program and a binding parking-overflow mitigation plan to be settled before the zoning takes final effect — not after, at Site Plan Control, once the envelope is already locked in.


Source: City of Ottawa Planning and Housing Committee report, File ACS2026-PDB-PSX-0040, submitted August 13, 2026. Full report and supporting documents available via the City's Development Application Search Tool.