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Tuesday, 28 July 2026

Achieving the Art of the possible

Decorum Isn't Manners. It's Infrastructure.
Ward 13 · Rideau-Rockcliffe · Campaign Blog

Decorum Isn't Manners. It's Infrastructure.

Ottawa is about to get a new mayor and, in many wards, a wave of new councillors. That turnover is an opportunity; but only if the people walking into City Hall in November understand what they're actually inheriting.

They're inheriting a police services board that, according to its own chief, doesn't have robust auditing of database access. They're inheriting an LRT extension still slipping timelines years after "fixed." They're inheriting a Lansdowne 2.0 debt load north of $16 million a year serviced against promises that taxpayers would carry none of the risk. They're inheriting a consolidated balance sheet with billions in liabilities that live off the books; an OMERS shortfall, an infrastructure gap in the double digits of billions, a utility whose own liabilities never show up in the city's official numbers. And they're inheriting a 311 system where a single data-integrity failure closed more than 120,000 tickets in six days without anyone flagging it as a governance problem.

None of that gets fixed by a council that spends its first year relitigating personalities, settling scores from the campaign, or performing outrage for a two-minute clip. It gets fixed by a council that can sit in a room, disagree on substance, and still do the work.

That's what decorum actually means in this context. Not politeness for its own sake; the capacity to hold institutions accountable without the process collapsing into theatre. Ottawa’s has had plenty of both this in the 2022 term: strong words at the podium, resignations framed as accountability, and very little in the way of follow-through once the cameras were off. The last OPS Board chair to resign did so vouching for the board's competence. Eighteen months later, an independent workplace investigations office had been quietly wound down and the Auditor General found the board's own reporting inaccurate. Strong words did not survive contact with the actual record.

A council that wants to be taken seriously in a term with this much to fix needs a different posture:

Disagree on the record, not around it. The public deserves to see committee votes and floor debates that actually engage with evidence; not statements crafted for a press release while the substantive positioning happens elsewhere.

Treat oversight as a job, not a talking point. You cannot call for stronger transit oversight for years and never sit on the Transit Commission or the Light Rail Subcommittee. Decorum includes doing the unglamorous committee work that oversight actually requires.

Let data close arguments instead of opening new ones. When a chief says database-access auditing "isn't robust," that's not a talking point to be managed; it's a gap to be closed, with a plan and a timeline. The same goes for liabilities, for the infrastructure gap, for crime clearance rates that have fallen even as headline numbers get debated. Bring the numbers. Argue about what they mean, not whether they're inconvenient.

Separate structural failure from individual blame; most of the time. Most of what's broken in this city is a structural problem: incentives, funding formulas, ward boundaries that concentrate voting power in ways that don't match where growth and strain actually are. A council that spends its energy chasing individual villains will miss the fixes that actually change outcomes. But structural focus isn't an excuse to let genuine failures of judgment go unaddressed either; decorum cuts both ways.

Commit to sunset reviews, not permanent positions. Every major liability decision, every big capital commitment, should come with a built-in point where council has to look at it again with fresh eyes and current numbers. That's a decorum issue too: the discipline to admit a prior decision needs revisiting, without treating that as a defeat.

None of this is about lowering the temperature for its own sake. Ottawa's problems are serious enough that they deserve a council capable of sustained, adversarial, evidence-based work; the kind that doesn't burn itself out in the first six months on grievance and instead spends four years actually closing the gaps it inherited.

The mess didn't accumulate because people were too polite. It accumulated because too much of the last several terms was spent on statements instead of follow-through. A new council that wants a different result should start by deciding what decorum is actually for.

Even the Councillor Everyone Wanted Gone Was Right About This One
Ward 13 · Rideau-Rockcliffe · Campaign Blog

Even the Councillor Everyone Wanted Gone Was Right About This One

Rick Chiarelli's name doesn't come up in Ottawa politics without the context that ended his career: a year-long integrity commissioner investigation that found he had subjected staff to repeated, serious harassment, followed by council voting to strip his pay and duties, followed by more complainants and more findings after that. There's no rehabilitating that record, and no reason to try. It was serious misconduct, independently investigated and independently confirmed.

But on March 6, 2019, sitting on a council that voted 19–3 to hand SNC-Lavalin a $1.6-billion contract to extend the Trillium Line, Chiarelli was one of the three votes against. He was right, and it's worth asking why, because the reason has nothing to do with his character and everything to do with a habit council should have kept.

The bid in question had failed the technical evaluation for the project — twice. Council wasn't told that. When Coun. Diane Deans pressed staff directly on whether SNC-Lavalin had cleared the minimum threshold, she was told she couldn't have that information, and arguably shouldn't be asking for it. An earlier motion to delay the vote by two weeks, just to allow more time to review the report, failed. Council approved the largest capital project in the city's history without the one piece of information that would have told them whether the winning bid was actually qualified to win.

The auditor general later found that staff followed the process correctly and weren't the ones who broke any rule. That's arguably worse, not better: the process itself was built to let this happen, and it took three votes out of twenty-two to say so out loud before the fact.

This is the part of the story that gets lost when a vote gets remembered only through the lens of who cast it. Diane Deans and Shawn Menard voting no is unsurprising — consistent with their broader records on procurement scrutiny. Chiarelli voting no fits no such narrative, and that's exactly the point. A no vote grounded in "we don't have the information to say yes" doesn't require the voter to be admirable. It requires the claim to be true. In this case it was: the information genuinely wasn't there, and the bid genuinely hadn't passed.

Ottawa's incoming council is going to face the same test repeatedly — not on this file, but on the next one, and the one after that. The instinct to sort every vote by who's popular, who's controversial, who's likeable is exactly the instinct that let a $1.6-billion contract sail through on a 19–3 vote while the people asking the hardest questions got told to stop asking. Evaluating a position on its merits, independent of who's making it, is not a nicety. It's the only way procurement failures like this one get caught before the money is spent instead of years after.

None of this is an argument for rehabilitating anyone's record based on a single vote. It's an argument for keeping the two questions separate: what someone did, and whether what they said on a given Wednesday afternoon happened to be true. Council conflated those questions in October 2020 when it debated Chiarelli's conduct, understandably and correctly. It had already conflated them in reverse eighteen months earlier, when the loudest objections to a flawed process came from voices council had reason to dismiss — and dismissed them anyway, at a cost of $1.6 billion and years of downstream construction delays.

A council that wants better procurement outcomes next term should get comfortable with an uncomfortable habit: taking an argument seriously regardless of who's making it, and holding people accountable for their conduct regardless of whether they happened to be right about something else. Both things can be true in the same council term. Ottawa's recent history shows what happens when they get treated as mutually exclusive.

Monday, 27 July 2026

Asset Management - what to do

The City's Hidden Debt — and Three Steps to Fix It

The City's Books Have Two Kinds of Debt: The Kind You Can See, and the Kind You Can't

A plain-language look at Ottawa's finances — and three steps to make them harder to hide.

The visible kind is the loans the city has taken out — that number gets reported, and by itself it doesn't look alarming.

The kind you can't see easily is everything the city already owes but hasn't put on the main bill yet: things like closing old landfills safely, cleaning up contaminated land, and — the big one — keeping roads, pipes, and buildings in good repair. The city has a plan for all of this, but the plan isn't fully funded. That gap is a real cost. It's just not written on the page most people look at.

Here's what I think needs to happen, in order:

1. Show people the real number

Right now, the full picture exists — it's in the city's books — but it's buried in technical reports nobody reads. Step one is simple: put the true cost of what we owe, including the stuff we're deferring, in front of council and the public in plain terms. You can't fix a problem everyone's allowed to pretend doesn't exist.

2. Make it a running scoreboard, not a one-time report

A single number is easy to shrug off. What matters is whether the gap is growing or shrinking year over year. I want that comparison published every single budget, automatically — so if a council lets the gap widen, everyone can see it happening in real time, not find out five years later when a pipe bursts or a rec centre closes.

3. Attach real consequences

Once people can see the gap clearly and see it every year, the next step is a rule: if the funding for road repairs, pipes, or buildings falls below a safe level, the city has to publicly explain how and when it'll fix that — not just note it and move on. That part takes a full council to agree to, not one person. But you can't get there without the first two steps making the case first.

The short version: you can't manage what you can't see, you can't hold anyone accountable for a trend you're only shown once, and you can't force a fix without first proving, repeatedly, that the problem is real and getting worse. Transparency isn't the whole fix — but it's the thing that makes a real fix possible.

Peter Karwacki — Candidate for Ward 13 (Rideau-Rockcliffe)

Ottawa's Hidden Garden

Ottawa’s Hidden Liabilities: When Off-Balance-Sheet Commitments Are Folded In

Ottawa’s Hidden Liabilities

When off-balance-sheet commitments for the library, LRT, Lansdowne, flooding infrastructure and the new hospital are folded in, the picture is no longer rosy.

July 27, 2026 · Analysis based on the City of Ottawa’s 2025 Consolidated Financial Statements and subsequent project updates through mid-2026

At December 31, 2025 the City reported $8.98 billion in total liabilities and $4.86 billion in net debt. Those figures already rose more than $1 billion in a single year. But they capture only what public-sector accounting rules require to be recognized today.

Large contractual construction commitments, multi-decade P3 maintenance obligations, approved-but-not-yet-issued debt, and high-profile political asks sit largely or entirely off the balance sheet. When those are brought into view, the true claim on future tax and rate revenues looks substantially heavier.

The core point: The accumulated surplus of ~$20.5 billion is real — but it is locked inside roads, pipes, rails and buildings. Cash and future revenue capacity are what service the debt and the commitments. Off-balance-sheet items compete for exactly that capacity.

1. On-Balance vs. Off-Balance Reality

Reported Liabilities vs. Approximate Additional Commitments

Off-balance estimate aggregates remaining capital-works commitments (~$1.7 B), residual Stage 2 LRT construction & long-term maintenance tails, Lansdowne debt still to be issued, Ādisōke residual, hospital ask, and known climate/flood resilience pressures. Long-term P3 service payments stretch decades and are only partially captured.

2. The Five Projects That Matter Most

Ādisōke Central Library

Original budget concept ~$175 million. By early 2026 the approved figure sat near $334 million. A further $18.5 million request (City share $11.5 million, largely new debt) pushed the total toward $352–353 million. Construction is ~85 % complete but the schedule has not stabilized; latest indications point to December 2026 with no firm public opening date.

Once open, new operating costs (staffing, facility operations, programming) will hit the annual budget. Those ongoing costs and any further overruns remain largely off-balance today.

Ādisōke Cost Escalation

Original concept → current approved trajectory (City + federal shares combined)

Transit – Stage 2 LRT

The program has grown past $5 billion. Trillium Line is in service and its P3 liability (~$129 million) is now on the books, to be repaid over 27 years at a high effective rate. Confederation Line east and west extensions still carry hundreds of millions in remaining construction commitments that the City must settle upon substantial completion.

Far larger are the multi-decade maintenance, lifecycle and availability payments for the combined Stage 1 + Stage 2 system. These cash obligations stretch 27–30 years and are only partially recognized as liabilities today. Contingency top-ups for oversight, claims and delays continue.

Public Works – Flooding & Stormwater Resilience

The July 1, 2026 extreme rainfall (thousands of basement floods) exposed capacity and deferred-maintenance gaps. Climate Ready Ottawa and the rate-supported Long-Range Financial Plan already allocate hundreds of millions to drainage, retrofits, flood-plain mapping and resilience work.

Replacement value of the broader water/wastewater/stormwater network has been cited in the tens of billions. Immediate response costs plus the capital upgrades that will follow post-event reviews are only beginning to crystallize. These are classic “known unknowns” that will appear as future debt or rate increases.

Lansdowne 2.0

Total project cost is framed at approximately $419 million. The City presents a “net cost to taxpayers” of roughly $131 million, but the financing plan includes ~$331 million in new debt to be issued later (servicing beginning in the 2030s), plus reserves, debt premiums, Municipal Accommodation Tax increases and partnership cash flows.

Until the debt is issued and construction is complete, the bulk remains an off-balance-sheet commitment. Auditor-general commentary has flagged thin contingency, tariff risk, and revenue assumptions.

Lansdowne 2.0 – Total Cost vs Net Taxpayer Cost vs Debt Still to Be Issued

New Civic Campus – The Ottawa Hospital

The City was asked in 2022 for a local contribution of up to $150 million as part of an estimated ~$700 million local share (original total project ~$2.8 billion). Staff are to bring funding options before the end of the current council term.

As of mid-2026 the main hospital design, final cost and schedule are still being finalized. The parking garage is advancing; the hospital itself is widely expected to slip well into the 2030s. Cost-escalation risk has been publicly noted. This $150 million (or higher) ask is not yet a recorded liability — it is a known, high-profile expectation that will compete with every other capital priority.

3. Putting the Pieces Together

Major Off-Balance & Near-Term Pressures (Illustrative Scale)

Orders of magnitude only. Long-term LRT maintenance tails and full stormwater replacement needs are larger still and extend over decades.

What “folding them in” means in practice:
• Remaining capital-works commitments already total ~$1.7 billion (heavily weighted to 2026).
• Stage 2 residual construction + multi-decade maintenance payments add hundreds of millions to low billions over time.
• Lansdowne debt of ~$331 million is still to be issued.
• Ādisōke residual City share and future operating costs continue to rise.
• The hospital ask of up to $150 million remains outstanding.
• Climate and flood-resilience capital will keep growing after the 2026 event.

None of this is secret. The contractual commitments appear in the notes to the financial statements. Project updates go to committee. What is missing from day-to-day discussion is the cumulative effect: a growing stack of claims on the same limited pool of future tax, rate and development-charge revenue.

Debt-service ratios remain within formal limits today. The accumulated surplus is large. Yet the speed of on-balance growth in 2025, combined with the scale of still-unrecognized or only partially recognized obligations, means the margin for error is thinner than the headline balance-sheet numbers suggest.

The rosy narrative rests on assets that cannot easily be turned into cash and on the assumption that revenues will keep rising fast enough to service everything that has already been promised. Off-balance-sheet commitments test that assumption hardest.

Sources

City of Ottawa Consolidated Financial Statements year ended 31 December 2025 (Audit Committee, June 2026); subsequent Finance & Corporate Services and related committee reports on Ādisōke, Stage 2 LRT, Lansdowne 2.0, Climate Ready Ottawa / stormwater programs, and the Civic Campus local-share request; public project updates through July 2026.

This is an independent analysis. Figures are rounded and drawn from publicly available documents. Long-term P3 maintenance totals and full infrastructure replacement needs are larger than the illustrative bars shown and extend over decades. Always consult the official statements and project reports for precise amounts and disclosures.

ii

Note:

If your councillor's response is merely "something needs to be done". Maybe you need to vote differently?

This time around, inform yourselves, vote differently, vote wisely. Vote for Peter Karwacki for Rideau Rockcliffe.


That's a big IOU

City of Ottawa Liabilities: The $1 Billion Jump in 2025 Most Residents Missed

City of Ottawa Liabilities:
The $1 Billion Jump in 2025 Most Residents Missed

On-balance-sheet obligations climbed 13% in a single year. Here’s the full picture — ranked by dollar value — plus the off-balance-sheet commitments that rarely make the headlines.

Published July 27, 2026 · Based on the City of Ottawa’s audited Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended December 31, 2025

Most Ottawa residents see their property-tax bill, transit fare, or water rate and move on. Very few open the City’s annual consolidated financial statements. Those statements, presented to Audit Committee in June 2026, reveal a striking fact: total liabilities jumped from $7.93 billion at the end of 2024 to $8.98 billion at the end of 2025 — an increase of roughly $1.05 billion, or 13%, in just one year.

Key takeaway: Net debt (liabilities minus financial assets) rose from $4.11 billion to $4.86 billion. While tangible capital assets still far exceed these obligations, the speed of growth in 2025 was markedly faster than the previous year.

1. Total Liabilities & Net Debt Growth

The chart below shows the sharp step-up in both total liabilities and net debt between 2024 and 2025.

Total Liabilities vs Net Debt (2024–2025)

Source: City of Ottawa Consolidated Statement of Financial Position (dollars in billions)

2. On-Balance-Sheet Liabilities Ranked by Dollar Value (Dec 31, 2025)

All figures below are in millions of dollars. Comparative 2024 values are shown for context.

2025 Liability Breakdown (Largest to Smallest)

Values in $ millions

Rank Liability 2025 ($M) 2024 ($M) Change
1 Net long-term debt 3,687 3,371 +316
2 Deferred revenue 1,868 1,613 +255
3 Accounts payable & accrued liabilities 1,575 1,229 +346
4 Employee future benefits & pension agreements 856 802 +54
5 Mortgages payable (mainly OCHC) 637 543 +95
6 Public-private partnership (P3) liability 129 136 –7
7 Asset retirement obligations 87 83 +3
8 Other liabilities 67 74 –7
9 Capital lease obligations 50 58 –8
10 Contaminated sites 22 22 0
Total Liabilities 8,978 7,931 +1,047
Composition of 2025 Liabilities

Net long-term debt remains the single largest component at 41%

What drove the biggest increases?

  • Accounts payable (+$346 M) — Timing of payments and higher operational accruals.
  • Net long-term debt (+$316 M) — New issues of ~$488 M (including sustainable debentures and a Canada Infrastructure Bank loan for zero-emission buses) offset by ~$155 M in principal repayments.
  • Deferred revenue (+$255 M) — Government funding for housing and childcare received but not yet spent.
  • Mortgages payable (+$95 M) — Continued Ottawa Community Housing construction and repair loans.
  • Employee future benefits (+$54 M) — Plan amendments for Ottawa Police Services and higher WSIB costs related to certain cancers.

3. Off-Balance-Sheet Commitments & Contingencies

These items do not appear as liabilities on the statement of financial position but represent real future claims on City resources:

Major Off-Balance-Sheet Items (Approximate Totals)

Capital works commitments are multi-year; largest portion falls in 2026

  • Future capital works commitments — Approximately $1.67 billion (largest near-term tranche ~$1.46 billion in 2026).
  • Loan guarantees — ~$157 million authorized, of which ~$104 million was outstanding.
  • Operating lease commitments — Roughly $71 million over the coming years.
  • Stage 2 LRT remaining construction & long-term maintenance — Significant residual construction costs plus multi-decade service payments.
  • Other — Hydro Ottawa service contracts, ice-rental P3 arrangements, joint-facility commitments (Ādisōke), Lansdowne revitalization agreements, and various legal contingencies.

4. Context & Why It Matters

Debt-service ratios remain comfortably below both provincial limits (25% of own-source revenue) and the City’s stricter internal targets. The overall accumulated surplus rose to about $20.5 billion, supported by strong growth in tangible capital assets (~$25.2 billion). New debt largely funded infrastructure that will serve residents for decades.

Nevertheless, a one-year increase of more than $1 billion in recorded liabilities — plus roughly $1.7 billion in near-term capital commitments — is material. It raises future principal and interest costs, increases sensitivity to interest-rate changes, and underscores the importance of aligning capital plans with sustainable revenue sources (taxes, rates, development charges, and senior-government transfers).

The 2024 increase in total liabilities had been a more modest $198 million. The 2025 jump was more than five times larger. That acceleration is the part most residents have not yet fully appreciated.

Sources

City of Ottawa Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended December 31, 2025 (presented to Audit Committee, June 19, 2026) and related notes on contingencies, commitments and contractual obligations.

This post is an independent analysis based on publicly available audited financial statements. Figures are rounded for readability. Always refer to the official statements for precise amounts and full disclosures.

Third Party news, not mine, not the city, not main stream

 Third party news

https://votegrid.ca/2026-ontario-municipal-election/ottawa-councillor-ward-13-rideau-rockcliffe

The Watchdog Doesn't Work at a Newspaper Anymore — Ward 13
Ward 13 — Civic Ledger FILE NO. 2026-014 · OPEN

The watchdog doesn't work at a newspaper anymore

There was a time when the only real opposition to city hall was the mainstream media. Today, anybody can write an email, put up a web page, or analyze a database — and that changes who city hall has to answer to.

Local news budgets have been gutted for a generation, and Ottawa is no exception — city hall has fewer full-time reporters covering it than it did ten years ago. But the tools that used to be a newsroom's exclusive advantage are now sitting on everyone's laptop. Anybody can write an email. Anybody can put up a web page. And increasingly, anybody can pull a municipal dataset and find something a press release was never going to tell them.

I don't think this is theoretical — I've been doing it. Three examples, from this campaign alone:

Exhibit A

311 Open Data

A review of the city's public 311 dataset turned up something nobody had flagged: over 123,000 service tickets bulk-closed in a six-day window. Not a scandal announced at a podium — a data integrity problem sitting in a public file, visible to anyone willing to open it and look.

Exhibit B

A records request

A request to OCDSB surfaced a list of properties under valuation — including one tied to a community hub — and put a documented question mark next to a "parking lot repaving" that looked more like a prelude to a sale.

Exhibit C

A budget line

When the Police Services Board's own director admitted the force's auditing of database misuse wasn't "robust," it didn't take an editorial board to connect that to a safe-workplace budget line that had quietly shrunk from $8.2M to $5.4M.

Why this matters more than it sounds like it does

None of this replaces professional journalism, and I don't want to pretend otherwise — there's real craft in beat reporting and real accountability in a newsroom's reputation being on the line. What's changed isn't that professional journalism stopped mattering. It's that it stopped being the only mechanism available.

Oversight that depends on a shrinking number of professional gatekeepers is oversight that's easy to starve. You don't need to silence anyone if there's no one left to ask the question. A council that knows only a handful of reporters are watching can plan around a handful of reporters. A council that knows any resident with a laptop might pull the data has a very different set of incentives.

The barrier to entry used to be institutional. Now it's mostly just willingness — to sit with a spreadsheet, to file the request and wait, to publish something knowing ten people might read it before a hundred do. That's a lower bar than a press badge, and it should be. Accountability shouldn't require a masthead.

Your turn to file something

You don't need a journalism degree or a data science background. You need an email address and the willingness to look. Here's where to start:

  • Pull a datasetOttawa's open data portal has 311 tickets, budgets, council votes, and more sitting in public files. Open one. See what's actually in it.
  • File a records requestMunicipal, school board, and provincial bodies are all subject to access-to-information law. A request costs a form and a small fee — and an answer, eventually.
  • Write it down and publish itA blog, a newsletter, a thread — it doesn't need a large audience to matter. It needs to exist somewhere city hall can't control.
  • Send it my wayIf you find something in the data or the paperwork that looks like it deserves a second look, I want to see it — and I'll help make sure it doesn't disappear.

The mainstream media isn't coming back to what it was. The alternative isn't nostalgia for that model — it's making sure the tools that replaced it actually work, and that city hall can't count on nobody looking.

Ward 13 Civic Ledger Peter Karwacki for Ward 13

Sunday, 26 July 2026

There is no shortage of money - for some things

Ottawa Can Find $419 Million. It Just Doesn't Find It For You.
Ward 13 · Civic Ledger

Ottawa Can Find $419 Million.
It Just Doesn't Find It For You.

Council spent three years finding the political will, financing structure, and staff time to push Lansdowne 2.0 to a final vote. The city's own auditor says fixing the housing waitlist costs about the same — and it isn't getting a fraction of the urgency.

On November 7, 2025, Ottawa city council closed the book on Lansdowne 2.0 — a $418.8 million redevelopment of TD Place with a new event centre, new north-side stands, and two residential towers on public parkland. It took three formal council votes since 2022, a full design and procurement cycle, an auditor general review, and years of committee hearings to get there. Mayor Mark Sutcliffe called it a "great opportunity for the city."

Meanwhile, roughly 10,000 households sit on Ottawa's centralized waiting list for social housing, some waiting the better part of a decade for a unit. The city's own affordable housing target — 5,000 new units by 2030 — is running at about a tenth of the pace needed to hit it. This isn't a story about whether Lansdowne 2.0 was worth building. It's a story about where a city's execution capacity goes when it decides something is a priority — and where it doesn't.

01 Two Price Tags, One City

Put the final numbers next to each other and the comparison is almost exact. Lansdowne 2.0's approved capital cost is within striking distance of what the city's auditor general says is needed to actually hit Ottawa's affordable housing target.

$418.8M Lansdowne 2.0 — approved capital cost
vs.
$565.1M City + senior-government funding needed to hit the 5,000-unit affordable housing target

Figure 1 — What it would take to close the gap

$418.8M Lansdowne 2.0 approved cost $188.4M Housing gap city share $376.7M Housing gap senior gov't share

Sources: City of Ottawa Auditor General estimate ($188.4M city investment + $376.7M in required federal/provincial funding); Lansdowne 2.0 final approved cost, Heritage Ottawa / CBC News, Nov. 2025.

Lansdowne 2.0's own cost history is instructive here too. The project was approved at $419 million in November 2023. By mid-2024, the city's auditor general found construction costs were understated by more than $74 million, pushing the realistic figure to roughly $493 million. The number moved by nearly 18% after council had already voted — and council kept going anyway.

02 The Debt Service Comparison

Annual debt servicing on Lansdowne 2.0 was pegged at $16.4 million a year when council approved it in 2023. By the time staff issued their October 2025 pre-vote memo, that figure had climbed to $17.4 million a year — and outside analysis using the auditor general's higher construction estimate puts the real annual carrying cost closer to $20–22 million once financing on the full $493 million is included.

Figure 2 — One project's yearly debt payment vs. the city's entire housing-access budget line

Lansdowne 2.0 debt servicing (annual) $17.4M / yr City's housing access & retention budget (2024) $33.5M / yr

Sources: City of Ottawa Infrastructure & Water Services memo, Oct. 20, 2025; City of Ottawa 2024 Budget (housing access & retention envelope, $33.5M); the613.substack.com debt-servicing analysis.

The city is servicing more debt on one recreation and condo project than it commits, in total, to keeping people housed.

03 What "Under-Resourced" Looks Like on the Ground

None of this is abstract for the roughly 22,500 households currently in Ottawa's community housing system, or the 10,000 more waiting to get in. Wait times for a subsidized unit routinely run five years or longer, and considerably longer for specific unit sizes.

Figure 3 — The affordable housing target vs. what's actually been delivered

5,000 2021–2030 target 466 (9.3%) Delivered, first 3 years

Sources: City of Ottawa Auditor General; Ottawa Citizen, "The Affordable Housing Conundrum," March 2024.

Community housing units citywide~22,500
Non-profit housing organizations operating them51
Households on the centralized wait list~10,000
Typical wait for a subsidized unit5+ years
2021–2030 affordable housing target5,000 units
Units actually delivered, first 3 years466 units (9.3%)
Federal Housing Accelerator Fund awarded (2024–27)$176.3M

The city has real tools on the table — the Housing Accelerator Fund, Action Ottawa, the tax increment equivalent grant program. What it hasn't had is the sustained, multi-year council attention and financing creativity it found for Lansdowne. A non-profit housing consultant summed up the gap plainly to the Citizen: the shortfall "is not a lack of land or capacity. It's a lack of money."

04 The Real Argument

This isn't a claim that Lansdowne 2.0 directly took a dollar from a housing project — the financing structures are separate. The argument is about capacity and priority. Council found sixteen votes, three years of staff time, a dedicated auditor general review, and a workable (if strained) financing structure to build a smaller arena and two condo towers on public parkland. The housing file, with a harder-nosed price tag from the city's own auditor and a waiting list in the tens of thousands, gets none of that same sustained institutional push.

That's a structural accountability problem, not a partisan one. It's also exactly the kind of outcome-over-output test this campaign has applied to the O-Train extension, the OPS Board, and the city's homelessness numbers: it isn't enough for council to say a priority exists. The measure is whether the money, the votes, and the follow-through actually show up.

The question for Ward 13, and for the city: if Ottawa can structure $419 million and three years of sustained council will for Lansdowne, what would it take to get the same treatment for the 10,000 households waiting on a list that hasn't moved?

References

  1. CBC News, "Council approves $419 million Lansdowne 2.0 plan" / Heritage Ottawa summary, Nov. 9–10, 2023 — approved cost, debt servicing estimate ($16.4M/yr), financing structure. heritageottawa.org
  2. CBC News, "Lansdowne 2.0 could cost $74M more than city estimate, auditor general finds," June/July 2024 — OAG revised cost estimate of $493.4M. cbc.ca
  3. City of Ottawa, Memo: Lansdowne 2.0 Redevelopment Project, Infrastructure and Water Services, Oct. 20, 2025 — updated debt servicing figure ($17.4M/yr). ottawa.ca
  4. CBC News, "Here's where your councillor stands heading into the final Lansdowne 2.0 vote," Nov. 7, 2025 — final council vote. cbc.ca
  5. Wikipedia, "2026 Ottawa municipal election" — project scope and Ottawa Charge departure context. en.wikipedia.org
  6. the613.substack.com, "Lansdowne Would be a 1% Property Tax Increase for Everyone in Ottawa" and "Lansdowne 2.0 Gets Up to $22 Million in Ottawa's 2025 Budget" — independent debt-servicing and annual-budget analysis. the613.substack.com
  7. City of Ottawa, "Facts at a glance — Subsidized housing" — unit counts, wait list size, wait times, number of housing providers. ottawa.ca
  8. Ottawa Citizen (via PressReader), "The Affordable Housing Conundrum," March 30, 2024 — 5,000-unit target, 466 units delivered, Auditor General's $188.4M/$376.7M funding-gap estimate. pressreader.com
  9. City of Ottawa, "Housing Accelerator Fund — Building affordable and supportive housing" — $176.3M federal HAF award, 2024–2027 disbursement schedule. ottawa.ca
Peter Karwacki for Ward 13 · Rideau-Rockcliffe · October 2026
9

Affordable Housing...stop the insanity

The Hotel Ledger — What $29 Million a Year Buys, and Doesn't
Ward 13 · Accountability Ledger

The Hotel Ledger: What $29 Million a Year Buys — and Doesn't

Ottawa's homelessness budget keeps flowing into motel rooms. A look at why the expense/asset line, not the non-profit/for-profit label, is the number that actually explains why housing stays unaffordable in Rideau-Rockcliffe and across the city.

A city can spend money two ways: as an expense that disappears, or as an investment that remains an asset. Ottawa's homelessness spending is a case study in the difference — and it explains, better than any abstract debate about margins, why the delivery model behind a housing unit matters as much as the unit itself.

01 The expense

In 2025, the City of Ottawa spent roughly $29.3 million housing homeless families in hotels and motels. That's not a one-time cost — it recurs every year the underlying shortage persists. Families placed this way stayed in shelter an average of 11 months, and about three in four were in overflow hotel and motel rooms rather than a dedicated shelter facility.

600+families in Ottawa's shelter system last year
11 moaverage family stay in shelter
76%of families in hotel/motel overflow, not dedicated shelter
16,000+households on the social housing waitlist, end of 2025

02 The asset

Compare that recurring bill to a single capital decision the City made this year: buying a vacant downtown hotel at 377 O'Connor St. for $45 million — with the federal government covering most of the cost — to convert into permanent transitional housing. It is, city staff said plainly, a better use of a building than parking families in motel rooms indefinitely.

Put those two numbers side by side and the ledger logic writes itself: at roughly $29 million a year, the City's motel spending would buy the equivalent of an O'Connor-St-sized asset every 18 months — except it buys nothing that lasts. One is an expense line. The other is a capital line. Only one of them still exists in five years.

Fig. 1 — Annual expense vs. one-time capital asset
2025 hotel/motel placements (recurring, annual)$29.3M / yr
377 O'Connor St. purchase (one-time, permanent asset)$45.0M once
Years of hotel spend to equal one asset purchase≈ 1.5 yrs

03 Why the delivery model is the actual variable

This is where the non-profit vs. for-profit distinction earns its place, rather than being a slogan. A for-profit developer's project has to clear a required return before it gets built at all — that return comes out of rent, permanently. A non-profit or co-op provider's project only has to cover its debt service, operating costs, and reserve fund. Break-even, not return-on-equity. That's the entire reason rent-geared-to-income housing — capped at 30% of a household's income — exists almost exclusively in the non-profit, co-op, and public sector in this city: no for-profit landlord will run a unit at a permanent loss relative to market rent.

The motel bill isn't a failure of the private market to be generous. It's what happens when a city relies on emergency, market-rate purchasing instead of financing the non-profit and public stock that doesn't need a margin to operate.

04 The supply gap behind the bill

The deeper problem is that Ottawa isn't building permanent stock fast enough to stop needing motels in the first place. The city's target was 5,000 new affordable units between 2021 and 2030. In the first three years, 466 were completed. The city's own auditor general estimated it would take roughly $188.4 million in additional city investment and another $376.7 million in federal and provincial funding to close that gap — money that competes, year over year, with the same budget paying the hotel bill.

Fig. 2 — 2021–2030 affordable housing target vs. units delivered so far

05 What this means for Ward 13

Rideau-Rockcliffe residents who list housing affordability as a top concern are, in effect, pointing at this same ledger. The fix isn't a slogan about "non-profits vs. developers" — it's structural: capital committed early enough, and predictably enough, that non-profit and co-op providers can secure their financing before a family spends another eleven months in a hotel room the city is paying for by the night. That's an accountability question, not just a compassion question — and it belongs in how this ward's councillor scrutinizes the housing capital budget every single year.

References

  1. City of Ottawa. "New strategy helps families experiencing homelessness move more quickly into stable housing." Ottawa.ca newsroom, 2026. ottawa.ca
  2. CBC News. "This single mom and her family have been living in Ottawa hotels for over a year." May 2026. cbc.ca
  3. CBC News. "City forges new plan to house Ottawa's homeless families." April 22, 2026. cbc.ca
  4. CBC News. "City poised to buy vacant downtown hotel to house families." Feb–March 2026. cbc.ca
  5. City of Ottawa. "Facts at a glance — Subsidized housing." ottawa.ca
  6. Ottawa Citizen (Pressreader). "The Affordable Housing Conundrum." March 30, 2024. pressreader.com
  7. City of Ottawa. "Programs and incentives — Building affordable and supportive housing." ottawa.ca
Peter Karwacki for Ward 13 (Rideau-Rockcliffe) · peterkarwacki.blogspot.com