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Wednesday, 21 January 2026

Sloly revisited - was this a catch 22?



When asked Grok said  

In many ways the situation Peter Sloly faced during the Freedom Convoy protests can reasonably be described as a Catch-22—a no-win dilemma where any realistic path forward led to severe criticism, loss of support, or professional ruin.

Here's why it fits the classic Catch-22 pattern (damned if you do, damned if you don't):
  • If he acted aggressively early (e.g., mass arrests, towing trucks, heavy enforcement to clear downtown quickly):
    He risked accusations of overreach, excessive force, violating Charter rights (peaceful assembly, expression), inflaming the protest into violence, or creating martyrs. The convoy had broad public sympathy in some quarters (anti-mandate sentiment was strong), and heavy-handed tactics could have escalated things nationally or drawn international backlash. Plus, with limited resources and intelligence gaps (POEC noted underestimation of scale), a premature crackdown might have failed spectacularly.
  • If he took a measured, de-escalation approach (as he largely did—negotiations, warnings, incremental enforcement, "shut down the fun" plan targeting amenities like DJs/hot tubs):
    He was slammed for inaction, leniency, allowing the occupation to drag on (3+ weeks of disruption, noise, economic harm to residents/businesses). Public frustration boiled over, trust eroded (he cited this as a key resignation factor), partner agencies (OPP/RCMP) hesitated on full support due to perceived weakness, and political pressure mounted (from council, mayor, feds). This path made him look incompetent or sympathetic, fueling calls for his head.
Either way, he was trapped: The protest's unprecedented nature ("Black Swan" per POEC), intelligence shortfalls, resource constraints, internal OPS rifts (some resistance to his reforms), and politicized environment (federal vs. local tensions) meant no clean "win" was available without massive risks.
  • Black community leaders and some experts framed his exit as scapegoating—blaming one person (especially as Ottawa's first Black chief) for systemic/multi-agency failures.
  • The POEC report supported nuance: It noted some of his errors were "unduly enlarged" (suggesting scapegoating), spread blame widely, and didn't portray him as the sole incompetent. Sloly later called it an "unprecedented national security crisis" institutions weren't prepared for, and said he felt vindicated.
It wasn't purely impossible—better early intel-sharing, unified command, or political backing might have eased it—but the structural/political bind made decisive success elusive. Sloly was in a classic damned-if-you-do/damned-if-you-don't spot, amplified by the crisis's scale and optics.

Too much Secrecy

 



Grok said:

Handling these situations—the Ottawa LRT project failures (as detailed in Justice William Hourigan's 2022 Public Inquiry report) and the leadership chaos during the 2022 Freedom Convoy (including the interim chief appointment mess, board turmoil, and broader police/city response)—should have followed established best practices for transparency, governance, accountability, procurement, crisis management, and police oversight. Many of these are drawn directly from the inquiries themselves (Hourigan for LRT; the Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC/Rouleau report), Auditor General audits, and related reviews for the convoy).

Here's a breakdown of how things should have been handled based on the recommendations and lessons learned from those sources.For Major Infrastructure Projects like the LRT (Transparency, Procurement, and Oversight)Hourigan's report made 103 recommendations, many focused on preventing secrecy, rushed decisions, and narrative control. Key ways to handle it better:
  • Full, proactive disclosure of risks and issues — Critical problems (e.g., trial-running failures, safety concerns) should be reported promptly and fully to all city council members, not just the mayor's office or select chairs. No selective withholding or "controlling the narrative" to protect political timelines (like election dates). Hourigan stressed that elected officials' involvement must be transparent and follow council's governance rules, including delegation policies with built-in accountability mechanisms (e.g., mandatory "reporting out" on delegated decisions).
  • Better procurement and P3 (public-private partnership) models — Evaluate alternatives to P3s for large projects; involve stakeholders (suppliers, operators, maintainers) early in planning/procurement to align incentives and reduce conflicts. Update city policies to require clear communication responsibilities in project agreements, enhanced oversight, and public transparency for major contracts (e.g., proactive disclosure of executed contracts over certain values).
  • Stronger accountability mechanisms — Reinforce staff codes of conduct for transparency; include "Delegation of Authority Implications" sections in reports; conduct independent reviews or audits earlier if red flags appear. Avoid unrealistic deadlines/budgets driven by politics—prioritize safety/reliability over optics.
In practice, this means regular, detailed public updates, independent technical audits during testing phases, and council votes on major milestones rather than backroom decisions.For Police Leadership Crises and Major Protest Events (like the Convoy)The convoy response involved intelligence failures, command confusion, board-chief tensions, and the interim chief fiasco. Audits (e.g., Ottawa Auditor General on the Police Services Board), POEC findings, and RCMP after-action reviews highlight these fixes:
  • Interim/Leadership Appointments — Follow Police Services Act procedures strictly: Use proper delegation (e.g., involve the full board or HR committee in vetting, criteria, and selection—not just the chair). Conduct open, competitive processes even for interims when possible, especially in high-profile crises. Avoid rushed, in-camera hires without consultation (as with the Torigian attempt). Audits found the 2022 delegation to Deans alone non-compliant—future delegations need full board input, transparency, and challenge opportunities.
  • Police Services Board Role in Major Events — Clarify/update policies (e.g., OPSB's "Major Events" policy) for collaboration with the chief: Require timely sharing of intelligence, operational plans, and critical updates at "critical points" (per Morden/Epstein reports analogies). Boards should be consulted on mission/objectives/priorities and get enough info to ensure plans align with public safety. Hold regular briefings during crises, not resist meetings.
  • Overall Protest/Crisis Response Best Practices (from POEC, RCMP "Project Natterjack," and audits) —
    • Early, accurate intelligence assessment and dissemination (no underestimating threats or failing to translate intel into plans).
    • Clear, unified command structures (e.g., consistent Incident Command System across agencies; better integration of OPS/OPP/RCMP).
    • Set the tone early with protesters (clear communication, de-escalation where possible, but firm enforcement of laws from the start to avoid escalation).
    • Pre-event planning with multi-agency coordination, resource requests, and contingency plans.
    • Avoid internal rifts or political interference—maintain operational independence while ensuring civilian oversight is informed and accountable.
    • Post-event: Conduct thorough after-action reviews, share lessons (e.g., better training on public order, threats briefings, equipment readiness).
In both cases, the core principle is avoiding unilateral, secretive actions that erode trust—whether it's a mayor withholding LRT info or a board chair rushing a chief hire. Emphasize documented processes, broad consultation, proactive transparency, and independent checks. Many of these reforms have been partially implemented in Ottawa (e.g., policy updates, better delegation reporting), but full adoption would prevent repeats of the "schmozzle."If you'd like specifics on any recommendation (e.g., from Hourigan's list or POEC), or how these tie into current 2026 practices, let me know!
Would Deans have kept her job, would Sloly?Would the OPS not have resigned?
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