For greater clarity, if I did have money (in 2022 King spent over $20,000 on his campaign) for signs I still would not put up the GD signs.

Instead, I'd get the 5,6,7,8's to come to Ottawa and hold a free concert.

That way you'd have an election you'd never forget!

This will have to do. Vote for Peter Karwacki for Rideau Rockcliffe

US Then vs Now and Collapse Risk

United States: Then vs Now, and Collapse Likelihood

“Then” is the mid-20th century / pre-1971 Bretton Woods period. “Now” is 2025–2026. Figures are rounded official or near-official estimates.

1. Structural comparison

Metric	Then (1950s–1960s / pre-1971)	Now (2025–2026)
Net international investment position	Net creditor (until mid-1980s)	Net debtor: about −$21.3 trillion
Federal budget balance	Often near balance or small deficit (~0.5% of GDP in the 1950s)	Deficit about 5.8–6.0% of GDP
Federal spending	Typically 17–20% of GDP	About 23.3% of GDP
Trade balance (goods + services)	Persistent surpluses until 1975	Persistent deficit (~$900 billion in 2025)
Debt held by the public	Falling toward the mid-20s% of GDP by the mid-1970s	About 99–101% of GDP
Personal saving rate	Commonly 8–12%	About 3%
Monetary standard	Gold / Bretton Woods	Fiat currency since 1971
10-year Treasury yield	Often 3–4.5% in the early/mid-1960s	About 4.8%

2. What “collapse” would mean

Not slower growth, not a recession, and not losing some share of world GDP. Collapse here means a disorderly break in solvency or governing capacity: default or coercive restructuring of Treasuries, a run on the dollar that ends its core reserve role, high/uncontrolled inflation, or the federal government becoming unable to perform basic functions.

3. Likelihood under the current path

Outcome	Horizon	Likelihood if policy stays on the current path
Sudden sovereign collapse / chaotic default / dollar disintegration	Next 10 years	Low (roughly 5–15%). Reserve-currency status, deep Treasury markets, taxing capacity, and the Fed make a sudden break uncommon even at high debt.
Fiscal stress: higher real rates, inflation pressure, crowding out, forced tax/spending adjustment	Next 10–20 years	High (roughly 50–70%) if deficits stay near 6% of GDP and debt keeps rising toward 120%+ of GDP.
Relative decline (smaller share of world output and power)	Already underway / next 20–30 years	Very high as a share-of-world measure. That is decline, not collapse.
Long-run unsustainable debt path without reform	20–50 years	Very high under current law. CBO-style baselines show debt held by the public rising from ~100% toward 120% by 2036 and much higher later if nothing changes.
Political disintegration of the United States as a state	Next 20 years	Low. Polarization and institutional strain are real; state failure is a different and much rarer event.

4. Why the path is dangerous but not automatically fatal

Pressure points: persistent primary deficits, rising interest costs, entitlement growth, low household saving, and dependence on foreign buyers of Treasuries. A country that is both a large net debtor and a large fiscal deficit country is more exposed if investors demand a higher risk premium.

Offsets that still argue against imminent collapse: the dollar remains the main reserve and invoicing currency; U.S. capital markets are the deepest in the world; the federal government can tax a large, high-income economy; the Fed can act as lender of last resort in dollars; and high-debt advanced economies (Japan is the extreme case) have gone far longer than critics expected without default.

The honest bottom line: the current path is fiscally unsustainable and raises the odds of a painful adjustment. It does not make a 2020s–2030s “USA collapse” the base case. The more probable bad outcomes are higher interest burdens, weaker private investment, periodic inflation or dollar scares, and delayed but severe policy corrections—not overnight national failure.

US Fiscal Path: Economic Effects on Canada, Ottawa, and Rideau-Rockcliffe

What the U.S. fiscal path means for Canada, Ottawa, and Rideau-Rockcliffe

The relevant issue is not national collapse. It is how large U.S. deficits, high public debt, and elevated Treasury yields pass through to Canadian trade, interest rates, the dollar, federal employment in Ottawa, and local housing.

1. The U.S. backdrop that matters

Compared with the mid-20th century, the United States now runs large budget deficits, is a net international debtor, has public debt near 100% of GDP, a low household saving rate, and a persistent trade deficit. Ten-year Treasury yields are around 4.8%. Those conditions raise the odds of higher U.S. borrowing costs and periodic dollar or rate volatility. They do not, by themselves, imply a breakdown of the U.S. economy.

U.S. condition	Then (1950s–1960s)	Now (2025–2026)
Budget balance	Near balance or small deficit	Deficit about 6% of GDP
Debt held by the public	Falling toward the mid-20s% of GDP by the mid-1970s	About 99–101% of GDP
External position	Net creditor; trade surpluses	Net debtor (~−$21 trillion); trade deficit
Personal saving rate	Often 8–12%	About 3%
10-year Treasury yield	Often 3–4.5% in the early/mid-1960s	About 4.8%

2. Canada: the real transmission channels

Canada remains highly exposed to the United States, even after some export diversification. The U.S. still takes about two-thirds of Canadian exports. Bilateral goods-and-services trade was still in the high hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025. A U.S. slowdown, higher U.S. rates, or tariffs therefore show up in Canadian growth before they show up in any abstract “systemic” story.

Channel	Current picture	Practical effect in Canada
Trade	U.S. share of Canadian exports about 66–72% in 2025–26, down from the old 75%+ range	Weaker U.S. demand or tariffs hit energy, autos, steel, lumber, and machinery. Ontario and Alberta feel this first.
Interest rates	Bank of Canada overnight rate 2.25%; U.S. federal funds around 3.6–3.75%; U.S. 10-year near 4.8%	Canada can set a lower policy rate, but mortgage and corporate spreads still move with global bond yields. Higher U.S. term premiums make Canadian borrowing less cheap than the policy rate alone suggests.
Exchange rate	About C$1.38–1.39 per U.S. dollar (roughly 72 U.S. cents)	A firm USD supports Canadian export receipts in loonie terms and raises the cost of U.S. goods, travel, and some inputs. A U.S. rate spike that pulls capital south can weaken the CAD further.
Fiscal comparison	Canadian federal debt about 41% of GDP; deficit near 2% of GDP	Canada has more fiscal room than the U.S. That is a buffer, not insulation. A U.S. growth shock still reduces Canadian revenues.

Net effect for Canada: slower export growth if the U.S. economy cools; stickier borrowing costs if U.S. yields stay high; and a currency that moves with U.S. rate differentials and commodity prices. Canada’s own current-account deficit is modest (about 1.4% of GDP). The binding constraint is trade and financial linkage, not a parallel U.S.-style debt ratio.

3. Ottawa: a capital-city economy, not an export mill town

Ottawa-Gatineau is built around the federal public service, professional services, tech, and local housing. It is less exposed to auto and steel tariffs than Windsor or Hamilton, and less exposed to oil prices than Calgary. Its main U.S.-related risks are second-round: weaker national growth, higher rates, and any further federal restraint.

Federal employment in Ottawa-Gatineau: about 146,000 as of March 2026, down from about 154,000 a year earlier. Ottawa itself had about 111,200 federal workers.
The federal public service nationally fell by more than 12,000 positions in the latest fiscal year, to about 345,000, with further reductions planned.
Ottawa housing has cooled. August 2026 average sale price was about $688,000, with sales down and prices roughly flat year over year.

Ottawa channel	What changes if the U.S. stays on a high-deficit, high-yield path
Federal payroll	If weaker growth or higher debt-service costs push Ottawa to keep shrinking the public service, that is the city’s main demand shock. Retail, restaurants, and downtown office use follow the headcount.
Mortgage rates	Even with a lower Bank of Canada policy rate, five-year mortgage pricing tracks bond yields. Higher U.S. term rates keep a floor under Canadian fixed-mortgage costs.
Citywide housing	Softer sales and limited price growth are already visible. More rate persistence would extend that, especially for condos and outer suburbs.
Trade-exposed firms	Ottawa has some export and defence-tech exposure, but the citywide effect is smaller than the public-service effect.

4. Rideau-Rockcliffe: two markets in one ward

Ward 13 is not a single housing or income story. Rockcliffe Park is a thin, high-price market of estates and diplomatic residences. New Edinburgh and Lindenlea are expensive but more ordinary. Overbrook, parts of Vanier, and newer sites such as Wateridge trade closer to citywide Ottawa prices.

Area	Recent price context	Likely economic effect
Rockcliffe Park	House averages around $2.2–2.3 million; listings often near $2.4 million; few sales per year	Prices are sticky because inventory is scarce and buyers are high-income. Demand depends on senior public servants, executives, and diplomatic households—not on U.S. factory orders. A smaller federal senior ranks or slower professional hiring can lengthen selling times more than it crashes prices.
New Edinburgh / Lindenlea	Composite benchmark about $951,000 (mid-2026); detached stronger than condos	More rate-sensitive than Rockcliffe proper. Detached stock has held up; apartments and townhouses have been weaker. Higher mortgage costs matter here.
Overbrook, Vanier, Wateridge and similar	Closer to Ottawa’s $620,000–$700,000 range, with more rentals and new supply	Most exposed to construction cycles, immigration policy, and carrying costs. This is where a softer Ottawa labour market shows up first.

What helps the high end of the ward

Diplomatic and official residences do not disappear because U.S. fiscal accounts look worse.
Scarce land, NCC greenspace, and proximity to Rideau Hall keep a floor under prestige values.
A weaker Canadian dollar can make local real estate cheaper for foreign missions and some non-resident buyers, though local Canadian incomes still set most prices.

What pressures it

Federal downsizing reduces the number of households that can service a $2 million mortgage.
High carrying costs (tax, insurance, maintenance) stay high even if sale prices stall.
Thin sales mean one or two motivated listings can move the “average” more than the neighbourhood’s long-run character changes.

5. What this means in practice

Place	Most likely economic outcome	What to watch
Canada	Softer export growth and less cheap credit if U.S. yields stay high; not a replica of the U.S. debt ratio problem	U.S. import demand, tariffs, oil prices, CAD, and Canadian five-year bond yields
Ottawa	Growth tied more to federal staffing and local rates than to U.S. factory output	Treasury Board headcount, National Capital Region employment, and Ottawa sales-to-new-listings
Rideau-Rockcliffe	Rockcliffe Park remains a defensive high-end pocket; the rest of the ward follows the broader Ottawa housing and job cycle	Days on market and listing discounts in Rockcliffe; detached vs condo split in New Edinburgh; rental and new-supply conditions in Overbrook/Wateridge

The useful conclusion is narrow. A United States that borrows heavily and pays a higher term premium makes Canadian money less cheap and Canadian exporters more exposed. Ottawa feels that mainly through rates and any further public-service restraint. Rideau-Rockcliffe, especially Rockcliffe Park, is buffered by scarce housing and official demand, but it is not independent of federal payrolls or mortgage costs.

Campaign Video

Friday, 4 September 2026

#489 ? Make that - 5 6,7,8 Gone, gone, gone-g-g-g-Gone yeah!!!